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Abstract 
 This paper describes a sequence of experiments addressing basic 
questions about the control of visual attention and the relationship between 
attention and object recognition.  This work reviews compelling findings 
addressing attentional control on the basis of high-level perceptual properties.  In 
five experiments observers were presented with a rapid sequence of object 
photographs and instructed to either detect or selectively encode a verbally cued 
object category.  When these object categories (e.g. “baseball”) were preceded 
by contextual images associated with a given object category (e.g. “baseball 
diamond”), observers were less likely to accurately report information about the 
target item.  This effect obtained with both detection and discrimination 
measures.  This evidence of attentional capture is particularly strong because 
associated contexts typically enhance object detection or discrimination, whereas 
here they harmed performance.  These findings demonstrate that observers use 
relatively abstract and elaborated representations when selecting visual objects 
on the basis of category.  Further, even when observers attempt to ignore 
depictions of associated contexts these images engage perceptual processing.  
That is, while participants were able to determine the target of their search 
categorically, they had relatively little control over the specific types of 
representations and information employed when performing an object search 
task.  After reviewing these five experiments, conclusions regarding the use of 
object-context association knowledge in vision are addressed.  
 1!
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Visual Attention 
Introduction 
 Understanding visual attention in natural settings requires theories that 
describe complex attentive behaviors (Shinoda, Hayhoe, Shrivastava, 2001).  
Observers seldom search sparse displays for orthographic targets, but locate 
and interact with objects embedded in scenes on the basis of hierarchically 
organized goals.  In some cases the precise visual details of a target may be 
unfamiliar to an individual looking for an object.  How is it that observers locate 
and selectively encode task relevant information in these perceptual tasks?  
What types of representations are matched against incoming sensory 
information?  These experiments provide evidence for the hypothesis that 
schematized representations of contexts associated with a target item are used 
to guide encoding.  Incoming information is prioritized to the extent it matches 
this rather abstract description.  Most intriguingly these experiments demonstrate 
that once an observer has chosen a target, the way in which these guiding 
representations are employed is at least partly out of an observer’s control.  
Observers can choose task relevant information, but only coarsely.  That is, 
when observers search for a target they cannot help but attend to contexts 
associated with that target--even when this harms performance. 
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 Remarkable progress has been made in understanding the basic visual 
properties employed by observers when selectively attending to objects or 
locations.  Sophisticated models explain performance when observers select 
targets based on low-level variables such as color, orientation, or shape 
properties (Treisman & Gormican, 1988; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel, 1989).  On the 
basis of these physical stimulus properties, observer performance in a variety of 
attentive tasks has been described effectively.  In paradigms involving visual 
search (Wolfe, 1998), rapid serial visual tasks (Leber & Egeth, 2006), target-
distractor interference (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; MacLeod, 1991), and spatial 
cueing (Adamo, Pun, Pratt, & Ferber, 2008), performance is driven by the 
relationship between attentional structures, a representation of the attentive task, 
and stimulus properties along task relevant dimensions.  These descriptions are 
inadequate, however, because perceptual processes typically operate on stimuli 
much more complex than typical visual search stimuli (Nakayama & Martini, 
2010).   
 If one wishes to describe attentive behaviors completely, our current 
understanding will have to extend to treating attention to more abstract stimulus 
properties.  In many cases observers need to identify and locate poorly 
characterized objects.  For example, tools may need to be identified on the basis 
of their function or affordances  (Forti & Humphreys, 2008).  Targets may be 
identified as members of particular broad or narrow category (Evans & Treisman, 
2005).  In unfamiliar tasks, target identifying features may only be available after 
extensive training (Barenholtz & Tarr, 2007).  Further complicating matters, 
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typically object search is embedded in a much larger task context.  Few 
observers are looking for static objects commingled with distractors in space, but 
for objects and events selected on the basis of affordances from in a rich, 
periodic, and noisy stream of visual information.   Our understanding of object 
search will be enhanced if research can describe the dependencies in time and 
space, or contextual factors, that determine search performance. 
 Understanding object search in context will require theories that address 
the sophisticated attentional control settings that inform selective processing.  
Attentional control settings (ACS) are representations of the criteria that identify 
relevant information in a selective perceptual task (LaBerge, 2002).  In many 
tasks, for an observer to selectively enhance or exclude perceptual information 
there must be a guiding representation that is available for comparison to 
incoming perceptual information (Wolfe, Cave, Franzel, 1989).  ACS may include 
representations of certain visual properties (Treisman & Gormican, 1988), 
objects (Downing, 2000), spatial locations (Posner & Cohen, 1984), search 
termination conditions (White & Davies, 2008), and high-level representations of 
a stimulus relevance (Koivisto & Revensuo, 2007).  It’s only due to the rich 
interplay of multiple ACS, and other task representation systems, that a limited 
capacity perceptual system can provide the information necessary to structure 
behavior adaptively in complex environments. 
 For example, suppose an observer was instructed to locate a green 
textbook in an unfamiliar room.  Because they are familiar with some of the visual 
details of the book, they can preferentially attend to locations containing green 
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surfaces of an area roughly consistent with a prototypical textbook.  In addition to 
this visual information, search can also proceed on the basis non-visual 
information about how textbooks are used and stored.  An observer might know 
that books are often found on bookshelves or in backpacks.  Observers can 
increase the efficiency of their search and reduce the likelihood of errors if they 
use all available information about the target.  There is already considerable 
evidence that when searching for an object, observers use knowledge about the 
relationship between a target and locations in a scene to structure their visual 
exploration of a scene (Castelhano & Heaven, 2010).  It is unclear to what extent 
the preferential allocation of attention to contexts associated with a target object 
is under an observer’s control.  The following discussion and experiments will 
address the predictive use of visual context in the automatic attentional selection 
of target objects.  The selection of associated visual contexts is argued here to 
be automatic in the sense of being obligatory (Logan, 1992).  These experiments 
show that when observers are searching for common objects, they involuntarily 
attend to scene contexts associated with those objects, even when this harms 
performance. 
Human Visual Attention 
 The study of human attentive capacities has been central in the 
development of modern psychological theory.  Generally, attention is 
characterized as a selective process wherein some subset of available 
perceptual information is sampled for more elaborated processing (Pashler, 
1999).  Given the range of behaviors involving the selection of information it is 
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not unsurprising that a number of varieties of attention have been hypothesized.  
For example, attentive behaviors can be considered in terms of the duration over 
which they operate, ranging from transient to sustained.  There are many ways of 
further subdividing attentional mechanisms (e.g. endogenous vs. exogenous, 
modality-specific mechanisms, etc.).  In the current discussion, visual attention 
will be emphasized.  Specifically, visual attention will be addressed in the context 
of goal-directed exploratory perception with demonstrations that conceptual 
information is involved in the control of these attentive processes. 
 There is an extensive literature investigating the role of attention in the 
performance of visual tasks.  Attention is implicated in the control of visual search 
(Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel, 1989), the encoding of items into visual short- and long-
term memory (Potter, 1975), the memorization of spatial locations (Awh, Jonides, 
& Reuter-Lorenz, 1998), and a variety of other visual processes.  In fact, the 
explanatory power of attentional theories is notable, with many models giving 
attentional mechanisms a central role in cognitive function.  This is not surprising 
because visual cognition is accomplished by a limited capacity perceptual 
system.  Demonstrations of inattentional and change blindness indicate that not 
all visual properties are similarly accessible (Mack & Rock,1998; Simons & 
Rensink, 2005).  Much of the recent work on visual attention has tried to measure 
the relative strength and boundary conditions required for visual stimulus 
properties to reach awareness or guide behavior (Most, Simons, Scholl, Chabris, 
2000; Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2007). 
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The Medium of Visual Attention 
 Significant theoretical development has been focused on the modes of 
representation used to guide visual attention.  When attention selects one subset 
of information over another, what information is available to guide this selection?  
Many researchers have claimed that visual information is sampled on the basis 
of its location in the visual field (Graham, 1985).  Alternatively, information might 
be selected using a perceptually organized representation of a scene (Scholl, 
2001).  The following discussion will briefly entertain these two possibilities.  In 
much the same way that attention may be allocated on the using either spatial or 
object-centered representations, later evidence will demonstrate that attention is 
allocated on the basis of both visual and conceptual information. 
 Spatial attention models.  Many early spatial selection of visual attention 
argued that selection occurred on the basis of location (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; 
Pashler, 1999).  When attention is directed toward a location in the visual field, 
observers’ responses to stimuli presented at that location is enhanced both in 
terms of accuracy and speed (Posner, 1980, Posner & Cohen, 1984).  This is 
true both in the case of overt orienting, in which attention is directed at a location 
along with eye movements that fixate the location, and in the case of covert 
orienting, in which attention is directed toward a location in the absence of eye 
movements (Carrasco, Penpici-Talgar & Eckstein, 2000).     
 Inhibition of return is one particularly strong demonstration of visual 
attention operating on the basis of a spatial representation (Posner, Rafal, 
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Choate & Vaughan, 1985).  Many researchers have presented evidence that 
visual attention relies on both the inhibition of irrelevant information and the 
enhancement of relevant information in selective processing (Watson & 
Humphreys, 2000).  Cuing a location with an onset that precedes a target by 200 
to 300 ms will facilitate responding to targets at that location.  However, if the if 
the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between cue and target exceeds 300 ms, 
what was once enhancement becomes inhibition.  This finding is explained in 
terms of an observer’s optimal sampling strategies while scanning visual 
information in the environment.  It is argued that visual attention tracks and 
inhibits recently attended locations in order to obtain as many uncorrelated 
samples of visual information as possible.   When the cue precedes the target by 
more than 300 ms, attention has already been deployed to that location and 
found no target.  The mechanisms of visual attention then begin the search 
process anew at another location.  This explains why responses are actually 
slower following a long cue to target SOA than when there is no cue at all.  
Researchers are able to measure the strength and distribution of this inhibition by 
presenting targets and onsets with various temporal and spatial parameters.  The 
magnitude of the inhibitory costs varies directly with the distance from the cue to 
target, suggesting that a spatial representation is being used to track recently 
attended locations.   
 Another piece of evidence supporting a spatial conceptualization of visual 
selective attention involves interference paradigms in which an over-learned and 
automatic task is put in conflict with a controlled, deliberate task.  Two examples 
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of interference paradigms are flanker and Stroop tasks.  In flanker tasks, subjects 
are instructed to respond to some centrally presented stimulus and ignore 
immediately adjacent distractors (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974).  These distractors 
are associated with either a compatible or an incompatible response relative to 
the centrally presented stimulus (compatible- x X x; incompatible- y X y).  The 
costs associated with the exclusion of this incompatible response can be 
measured in terms of accuracy or, most often, latency.  The Stroop task is similar 
and usually involves linguistic stimuli presented in a setting where subjects must 
respond only to the perceptual and not the semantic characteristics of the 
(usually verbal) stimulus (MacLeod, 1991).  When the semantic characteristics of 
the stimulus are incompatible with the perceptual task, or even simply engaging, 
costs are observed in response times.  In both of these paradigms, costs 
associated with incompatible stimuli are reduced when the distance between the 
focal and interfering portions of the display is increased.  Taken together, these 
and other data support a model of visual attention where spatial representations 
play a central role in the capture, deployment, and guidance of visual processing. 
 Perceptual organization based models.  An account of selection based 
solely on spatial location is complicated by demonstrations that perceptual 
groups, or objects, can drive visual attention (Scholl, 2001).  In one of the first 
studies to demonstrate object based attention, Duncan (1984) instructed subjects 
to respond to the visual properties of two spatially overlapping objects.  For one 
object, a diagonally oriented dashed line, subjects were instructed to respond the 
line orientation and texture.  For another object, a box with a gap along one of its 
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two vertical sides, subjects were instructed to respond to the size of the box and 
the orientation of the gap.  After being shown the two objects briefly, subjects 
reported two of the visual properties of the objects.  Importantly, these properties 
could be from the same object or from different objects.  Accuracy was higher 
when the two probed visual properties were from the same object as opposed to 
when the visual properties were from two different objects.  This two object cost 
was interpreted as evidence that attention can be allocated toward objects in 
much the same way that it can be allocated toward locations.  However, it can be 
difficult to determine whether the two object cost observed is perceptual or 
mnemonic (Awh, Dhaliwal, Christensen & Matsukura, 2001).  In so far as 
subjects are instructed to reply first regarding a property of one object and then 
regarding a property of a second object, two object costs could be the perceptual 
costs of attending to two objects in the world or the memory-based cost of 
retrieving information associated with two separate memory representations. 
 This two object cost has been replicated in experiments that control for the 
types of reported visual properties in a more sophisticated manner.  Baylis & 
Driver (1993) presented observers with perceptually ambiguous stimuli 
containing two inward facing convex contours.  Observers were instructed to 
indicate whether the contours matched.  In a manner similar to the familiar face-
vase illusion (Rubin, 1915), these two contours could be interpreted as belonging 
to two inward facing objects against an empty central region, or as the outer 
contours of a single, centrally presented object against two peripherally located 
empty regions.  Experiment instructions biased subjects toward one of these two 
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interpretations.  Subjects who interpreted the two contours as belonging to a 
single object were faster in their contour matching judgments than subjects who 
interpreted the contours as belonging to two separate objects.  This finding is 
particularly interesting because the exact same stimulus and response was 
employed in both conditions. 
 Of course, few researchers would argue that all attentional selection 
occurs on the basis of objects.  There is clearly a role for both object based and 
spatial mediated visual attention.  The interaction between these two factors was 
investigated in a study by Egly, Driver, & Rafal (1994).  Adapting earlier work by 
Posner (1980) demonstrating that observers can respond to a target faster when 
it is preceded by a spatial cue, Egly and colleagues presented subjects with two 
objects in a cuing paradigm.  Targets could occur in any of 4 locations, each at 
either end of two rectangular objects.  Distance between these four locations was 
equated such that the distance between locations within an object was matched 
to the distance between locations on two objects.  Abruptly appearing spatial 
cues preceded target appearance in a manner demonstrated to capture transient 
spatial attention.  The relationship between the cues and the targets was 
manipulated so that the cue and target could appear at the same location within 
an object, at different locations within an object, or on different objects entirely.  
As one might expect, responses to targets were fastest when the cue and the 
target appeared at the same location within the same object, replicating Posner 
and others.  However, responses to targets appearing within the same object as 
the cue were faster than responses to targets appearing in a different object from 
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the cue, despite the fact that the distance from cue to target was equivalent 
between these two conditions.  This suggests a role for both object and spatial 
visual attention in the detection of abruptly appearing targets within objects. 
 While the objects presented by Egly and colleagues were defined in terms 
of common region, there are other explanations compatible with the observed 
pattern of responses.  Avrahami (1999) essentially replicated this study, but used 
partial object cues containing only a set of parallel lines instead of complete 
rectangles.  A similar within object advantage was found, despite the fact that the 
objects were only partially indicated.  Avrahami argued that the advantage for 
within object comparisons observed previously may in fact result from facilitated 
attentional guidance parallel to, as opposed to perpendicular to, the presented 
lines. 
 The possibility that the axis along which comparisons are made plays a 
role in object based attention was evaluated by Crundall, Cole, & Galpin (2007).  
Observers were presented with several dashed lines in various configurations 
and instructed to indicate whether two target features were contained within the 
same or different objects.    When targets appeared along collinear portions of a 
given line-object group, facilitation was observed.  However, when targets 
appeared within portions of an object that were not collinear, there was no within 
object advantage.  The authors argue that previous studies may have conflated 
object based advantages with advantages due to collinearity.  
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 Evidence gathered by Behrmann, Zemel, & Mozer (1998) extended early 
demonstration of object based attentional effects with objects whose spatial 
continuity is interrupted by an occluder.  Observers were presented with objects 
containing either two or three bumps at opposite ends of an extended rectangle.  
Subjects were to indicate as quickly as possible whether the number of bumps 
were equivalent.  The locations of the two sets of bumps were manipulated so 
that they either  appeared on the same or different objects.  A similar within 
object advantage was observed in both the single object continuous and single 
object occluded condition. 
 On the basis of these and other studies, one is forced to conclude that the 
control of visual attention occurs on the basis of both spatial properties and 
perceptual organization.  In fact, many researchers have argued that attentional 
control is flexible and can be directed by a variety of modes of representation 
(Tipper & Weaver, 1998; Nakayama & Martini, 2010).   If attention supports the 
guidance of action in natural environments, then object representations likely 
guide perceptual processing because objects are the targets of actions.  
However, attentional mechanisms may be sensitive to the regularities in the task 
and environment such that different tasks employ wholly distinct modes of 
attentional control.   
The studies above demonstrate that visual attention is relatively flexible.  
In certain circumstances it appears to be guided on the basis of location in the 
visual field.  In other circumstances, it is allocated on the basis of learned 
regularities of visual experience.  After briefly treating some examples of models 
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of visual cognition where attention is given a central explanatory role in order to 
motivate our discussion, we’ll return to discuss the nature of the attentional 
control settings that support this flexibility.  In the following examples, attentional 
mechanisms are implicated many cognitive phenomena typically associated with 
memory (e.g. feature integration).  These accounts underscore the importance of 
understanding the attentional control settings that govern attention in the larger 
context of visual cognition. 
Attention in Theoretical Accounts of Visual Cognition 
 Feature integration theory.  A broad framework for attentive perceptual 
processing is developed quite successfully in Treisman’s Feature Integration 
Theory (Treisman & Gormican, 1988).  This model accommodates a large body 
of visual cognition data with relatively simple formalizations.  Stated generally, 
Treisman argues that performance in a variety of perceptual tasks results from 
the storage of independent perceptual dimensions (e.g. color, orientation, etc.) in 
multiple, parallel feature maps and the integration of these parallel features by 
visual attention. 
 One task where Feature Integration Theory (FIT) has been particularly 
successful involves the detection and identification of a target element amidst 
distractors, known as visual search.  By presenting targets and distractors in 
specific combinations, researchers can measure the search efficiency of visual 
attention.  On the basis of a large collection of search efficiency data, 
researchers have posited a broad distinction between the pre- and post-attentive 
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representations and processes that govern attentive behavior (Neisser, 1967).  
The attentional selection of a target in visual search is hypothesized to occur on 
the basis of two visual procedures: serial and parallel search.  In the case of 
serial search, items are encoded serially into a comparison process that matches 
them to a top-down representation of the target.  When items are searched in 
parallel, multiple items are compared to this target representation simultaneously.  
Critically, serial and parallel visual search are argued to have distinct effects on 
observer reaction times when plotted against the number of searched items.  
When observers are searching for items serially, reaction times will increase as a 
function of the number of checked items.  When observers are checking items in 
parallel, the relationship between response times and the number of elements is 
not nearly as strong and direct as in the case of serial search.  By analyzing 
reaction times for target-absent and target-present trials across different set sizes 
with varied target-distractor relationships, researchers have identified features 
whose processing depends on the serial allocation of visual attention and those 
that can be processed in parallel.    Associated with these two visual routines are 
two modes of stimulus representation.  Parallel processing is argued to operate 
on simple unidimensional (e.g. color) object representations whereas serial 
processing utilizes integrated, complex, multidimensional object files.  There are 
a number of features such as orientation, color, and size that seem to be 
processed without respect to the capacity limitations typical of other visual 
processing tasks. 
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 Continuing with Treisman’s account, perceptual processing of featural 
singletons (along whatever dimension is critical in the task) occurs utilizing 
simple boolean feature maps that describe, in a spatially isomorphic form, the 
presence or absence of a given feature in a display.  These maps exist in parallel 
and do not code object properties in relation to one another.  Further, the 
information contained in these simple feature maps can be accessed in parallel.  
Apart from these individual feature maps, there exists a master map of locations.  
Visual attention is allocated in reference to this master map of locations.  Once 
attention is directed to a location on the master map of locations, information at 
associated locations in all the separate features maps is accessed and integrated 
into a single object file.  The process of integrating these various pieces of 
sensory information is known as binding.  Attentive mechanisms are 
conceptualized as fundamentally conservative and do not invest greater 
resources in a given cognitive task than are required.  As such, if a search task 
can be accomplished using one of these simple feature maps, visual attention 
will not be required to bind features across separate feature maps.  However, 
when observers are looking for a target that can only be identified using 
information integrated between feature maps, as is the case in conjunction 
search, visual attention will be required to bind these separate features together 
into a unified percept.  Once a bound representation is available, an observer 
can match this object file to those stored in either short- or long-term memory. 
 While FIT provides a wonderfully lucid description of the processes 
involved in visual search, it also predicts findings outside of the search literature.  
 16!
Specifically, in situations where visual selective mechanisms are strained, 
subjects are more likely to incorrectly combine features from separate objects.  
These illusory conjunctions occur when information from one pre-attentive 
feature map is incorrectly associated within information from another feature map 
by visual attention.  The conditions that can stress attentive performance are 
numerous and give a strong test to the generality of FIT account of binding and 
conjunction search.  Since attentional selection occurs in both time and space, 
attention can be negatively influenced by presenting stimuli that are brief in 
temporal extent or broad in spatial extent.  This gives attentional mechanisms a 
shorter amount of time per unit of visual information in which to integrate 
information from individual feature maps.  As would be predicted, when 
observers view too numerous or briefly presented stimuli, their binding 
performance suffers.  Similarly, if participants view stimuli in a dual task setting, 
such that less attention is available for individual tasks, illusory conjunctions are 
more likely.  Lastly, if a participant sustains damage to the parietal cortex, an 
area closely associated with the allocation of spatial visual attention, illusory 
conjunctions occur at a pathologically high level (Robertson, Treisman, 
Friedman-Hill, Grabowecky, 1997).  This neuropsychological disorder, known as 
Balint’s Syndrome, results in significant disruption to object integration processes 
and renders victims unable to report veridical conjunctions despite viewing times 
lasting seconds (Rafal, 2003).  
 Coherence and FINST theories.  An even more significant role for visual 
attention is described in coherence theory (Rensink, 2000).  Within this account, 
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attention is involved not only in the binding of a durable integrated representation 
of an object, but is also required for the sustained existence of the object in 
memory.  Largely drawing support from the failures of memory demonstrated in 
change blindness, Rensink argues that once attention is removed from an object 
the object, as an explicit integrated perceptual representation, ceases to exist 
(Rensink, O’regan, & Clark, 1997).  This is thought to explain why observers 
experience such difficulty when detecting changes between successively 
presented scenes.  The currently presented scene or object cannot be compared 
to a more durable representation in memory because a durable object file simply 
does not exist.  Critically, only very few (4 or fewer) objects are available for 
attentive inspection at any given moment.  Once attention is withdrawn, the 
object file is completely over-written by subsequent attended objects.  As the 
author points out, this position is at variance with the modal model (Shiffrin & 
Schneider, 1977) wherein short term memory is an activated portion of the 
greater long term memory system and short term memory activation persists 
when attention is removed.  Within the coherence model, attention is given a role 
beyond simple filter or binder, but is directly responsible for sustaining 
representation long enough for basic operations to be performed on them.  It is 
argued that detailed visual memory is largely unnecessary because eye 
movements are rapid, metabolically inexpensive, and capable of delivering high 
quality sensory information.   
 The coherence model of attention fits within the larger theoretical 
framework of Rensink’s triadic architecture.  Within this model there are three 
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subsystems that support online scene perception.  First, there is an efficient low-
level visual system capable forming a volatile representation of crude visual 
elements rapidly and in parallel across the visual field.  From this large assembly 
of proto-objects, limited capacity attention selects a small subset of objects for 
elaboration.  These objects are available to awareness.  Apart from the low-level 
visual system and the limited capacity attentional interface between low- and 
high-level vision, Rensink also posits a unlimited capacity high level visual 
attention control structure that can direct attention to various objects in the visual 
field according to high-level interests such as curiosity, observer motivation, or 
task set. 
 Deictic accounts of memory use indexical systems to locate and track 
information in the world.  Rensink’s indexical model shares many attributes with 
the fingers of instantiation, or FINST, model developed by Pylyshyn & Storm 
(1988).  The FINST model is designed to account for performance in what the 
authors refer to as “situated vision”; that is, vision for the recognition of objects 
and the control of directed action.  According to Pylyshyn & Storm, an indexical 
system deploys sticky pointers that track objects and their locations in the world.  
This tracking can occur in parallel at several locations across the visual field.  It is 
emphasized that the maintenance of identity, or the knowledge that a certain 
object has a continuous and integral existence, is one of the functions of these 
pointers.  This tracking of specific objects over time despite sensory similarity to 
distractors is a key component both within the FINST account and the multiple 
object tracking studies that provides some its strongest evidence.  There are five 
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key elements to the FINST model as elaborated by Pylyshyn (2001).  First, low-
level features are segmented and clustered into perceptual similar regions, often 
forming objects or parts of objects. These activated clusters then compete for 4 
to 5 available tracking indices.  The assignment of these indices is largely 
stimulus driven and inaccessible to high-level considerations.  This stands in 
contrast to Rensink’s account wherein visual attention can be directed in a 
manner approximating top-down control.  These indices, then, are bound to the 
available objects even if the features of those objects change over time.  It is the 
continued identity of the object that is critical, not some set of object features.  
Lastly, and similar to the coherence model, only those objects which are currently 
indexed are available for more elaborate processing.  It should be noted that 
initial descriptions by Pylyshyn and colleagues suggested that this indexical 
system is pre-attentive and tracks locations in a manner independent of 
attentional resources.  Authors argued that some pre-attentive representation 
would be required to provide locations to an attentional control system that could 
then orient to the supplied location.  However, recent evidence is consistent with 
the claim that the attentional tracking described by Pylyshyn draws on 
mechanisms shared with other visual attention tasks (Scholl, 2001). 
 While differences exist between Rensink’s and Pylyshyn’s models of 
attention and short-term perceptual memory performance, in both cases what is 
often treated as a function of memory, such as establishing object identity over 
time or integrating multiple visual objects, is explained in terms of a more 
complex attentional structure.  What is primarily of interest in the current 
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discussion is the integral role attention is given in sustaining any sort of 
productive perceptual engagement with the environment.  Since visual attention 
is something of a lynchpin for many important explanations of visual function writ 
large, expanding our current understanding of the processes and representations 
involved in attentive operations is vital.  For attentive mechanisms to be ascribed 
such an important role in the heterogeneous tasks that comprise visual cognition, 
these mechanisms need to be configurable for a given task.  The following 
discussion addresses the control of visual attention for a given task. 
Control of Visual Attention 
 Top-down and bottom-up factors in ACS.  Much effort has been 
dedicated to establishing the criteria available to the selective mechanisms that 
govern visual attention.  The selection criteria, or attentional control settings, 
employed in a given attentive task have a variety of aspects worthy of inquiry.  
For example, researchers have investigated the complexity of the selection 
criteria.  This line of research has been critical in determining whether signals 
can be attended on the basis of high-level attributes, such as meaning.  One 
important theoretical distinction within these selective mechanisms involves the 
degree to which a given attentive act is under the control of the observer.  In a 
variety of experimental paradigms, researchers have measured the extent to 
which selection mechanisms can be considered volitional or dispositional.  
Dispositional selection processes are usually referred to as bottom-up and 
involve the capture of attention regardless of the observer's intentions (although 
weaker formulations are permitted).  Volitional selection processes are usually 
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referred to as top-down and involve the control of attention in a manner 
consistent with observer's current motivation and goals as represented in working 
memory (LaBerge, 2002).  Recent research has focused on the distinction 
between these two selection mechanisms and boundary conditions for each 
(Theeuwes, 2004; Folk, Remington, Wright, 1994).   
 For example, much recent work has evaluated the role of transients in 
driving the enhanced processing of stimuli.  Specifically, the role of onsets, or 
abrupt object appearances, in capturing transient attention, establishing inhibition 
of return, or other attentive phenomena has been a particularly fruitful domain of 
inquiry (Yantis & Jonides, 1996).  The types of stimuli and discontinuities that can 
attract attention regardless of an observer's efforts remains a controversial area 
and is, for obvious reasons, quite interwoven with the literature establishing 
boundaries between top-down and bottom-up attentional effects.  
 At the same time, researchers have explored the nature of top-down 
attentional effects.  It is possible to consider the nature and flexibility of 
attentional control settings (ACS) in a manner that is at least partly independent 
of general selection mechanism (e.g. guided search vs. feature integration 
theory).  There is clear evidence that the likelihood and quality of attentive 
engagement with a given stimulus is at least partly dependent on the observer's 
intentions (Folk & Gibson, 2001).  There is strong evidence that attentional 
control as an individual differences construct is distinct from attentional scope 
(Cowan, Fristoe, Elliot, Brunner, & Saults, 2006).  Top-down attentional set has 
been conservatively defined as “a preparatory state of the information processing 
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system that prioritizes stimuli for selection based on simple visual features” 
(Leber & Egeth, 2006).  It is argued that when an observer has a particular goal 
in mind and the behavior required to accomplish that goal has some perceptual 
component, temporary changes are made to the parameters of the observer's 
ACS.   While a more specific definition is desirable, the complexity of volitional 
attentive behavior and the number and variety of demonstrated effects makes 
summary description difficult.   
 Before elaborating on the scope of the volitional attentive behaviors that 
are governed by control parameters, it’s desirable to clearly identify the role of 
ACS within the larger attentional system.  Within a given attentional module, 
coordinated activity is generated jointly by a controller and the controlled 
expression of the parameters established by that controller (LaBerge, 2002).  For 
example, if an observer were to attend to only the green elements in a visual 
search display, the control module would represent the visual properties that 
could be used to identify the green subset of all the present elements.  The 
controlled expression of those control parameters, if successful, would result in 
the selective perceptual enhancement of just those elements that fit the criteria 
identified by the controller.  While this example involved the use of a color 
property, the same could be imagined for location, shape, size, or other visual 
dimension.  Of course, this is a consideration of attentional control at the most 
feature-bound, detailed level.  Many accounts of ACS are more expansive, 
encompassing higher level attentional parameters.  These more abstract 
attentional parameters can include attentional strategies, search stopping criteria, 
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facilitative and inhibitory modulations of feature specific processing, or selective 
processing of a stimulus dimension (as opposed to a level along a stimulus 
dimension).   
 There are some perceptual tasks that can be performed with comparable 
levels of accuracy using distinct attentional strategies.  In one such instance, 
observers might be instructed to detect and respond to a target with a known and 
unique color in a uniformly colored collection of distractors.  The target can be 
identified either by selecting the target on the basis of its known color (feature 
search) or by selecting the target on the basis of its dissimilarity from the 
distractors (singleton search) (Leber & Egeth, 2006).  It has been demonstrated 
that observers spontaneously develop these attentional strategies, these search 
strategies persist well beyond the initial experimental session, and the strategies 
are relatively abstract (Leber & Kawahara, 2009).  In terms of abstraction, 
observers have been demonstrated to perseverate with a given search strategy 
(e.g. feature search) independent of the actual feature level required by the task.  
For example, it has been demonstrated that after returning to complete another 
RSVP task a week after initial participation, observers showed attentional capture 
by an irrelevant color in a manner consistent with feature based search despite 
the fact that the color of the target had changed between sessions. 
 In the case of visual search, ACS are believed to govern the termination 
conditions in visual search (White & Davies, 2008).  When presented stimuli 
match observer’s expectations in terms of scope (e.g. the number of to-be-
processed elements), observers are less likely to report unexpected visual 
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elements.  When certain expectations are violated unexpected elements are 
more likely to be identified.   
 Additionally, ACS can function as either excitatory or inhibitory in a given 
context (Watson & Humphreys, 1997).  That is, these parameters can identify 
items for either enhanced processing or exclusion depending on task factors.  If 
observers are presented with visual search displays that contain unpredictably 
colored targets but distractors of a consistent color, savings are observed 
because the observers are able to selectively inhibit distractors of a given 
expected color. 
 Attentional control and perceptual organization.  ACS exist at many 
levels and include not only changes in the weights associated with different 
perceptual dimensions as one looks at a fixed location, but shifts of spatial 
attention as well.  When observers shift attention either within an object or 
between two objects, there are a number of ways in which performance might be 
impacted.  Brown & Denney (2007) considered the possible roles of attentional 
engagement and disengagement systems in between- and within-object 
attentional shifts.  Borrowing heavily from Egly and colleagues original cuing 
design, the authors presented observers with a target detection task in which 
targets could appear either within or outside of objects.  As with previous studies, 
the cue-target distance for both within and and outside cuing conditions was 
equated.  By comparing facilitation when the cue lies within the same object, 
when the cue lies within a different object, or when the cue lies outside an object, 
the relative costs of disengagement and engagement can be assessed.  There 
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was little difference when observers were required to shift attention between 
objects as opposed to shifting attention between an object and a location.  Also, 
there was a larger response time cost associated with an attentional shift from an 
object to a location than an attentional shift from a location to an object.  These 
findings are consistent with the idea that the within-object advantage is actually a 
between-object disadvantage due to the difficulty involved in disengaging 
attention from an initially attended object.  
 While traditional accounts of these object based attentional effects 
construe the facilitation in processing within-object features as sensory 
enhancement, recent evidence complicates this interpretation (Shomstein & 
Yantis, 2002; Shomstein & Behrmann, 2008).  Within the sensory enhancement 
account (e.g. Desimone & Duncan, 1995), superior performance within an object 
is believed to result from an improvement in the quality of early sensory 
representations because attention has spread throughout the object.  When 
between object competition is biased in favor of one object over another, it is 
able to recruit additional processing resources for all contained features.  An 
alternative account, suggests that object structure influences the prioritization of 
subsequent attentional samples.  When an observer is instructed to make 
judgments regarding multiple features within an object, it is easier for attention to 
sample information within, as opposed to between, objects.  Shomstein & Yantis 
(2002) presented subjects with a flanker task in which the distractors were either 
contained within the same object or contained in a different object.  Regardless 
of the grouping of flanking distractors, interference effects were similar.  Only 
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when observers were presented with a task that required the exploration of a 
given object (due to spatial uncertainty regarding target position) did an object 
based advantage obtain.  The authors highlight the difference between the valid 
cue-same object and invalid cue-same object conditions in the study by Egly and 
colleagues.  They argue that if attention spreads completely through the object, 
there would be no difference between these two conditions.  However, the 
opposite pattern was observed with a valid cue advantage, suggesting that 
attention does not spread equally through an object. 
 Shomstein & Behrmann (2008) explored two possible means by which 
attentional prioritization might occur.  On the one hand, prioritization could occur 
on the basis of configuration such that objects defined in terms of gestalt 
grouping principles (e.g. common region) are preferentially explored and 
sampled.  In contrast, prioritization could occur using probabilistic guidance such 
that targets at high probability locations will be detected before targets appear at 
low probability locations.  The rationale for this second possibility is supported by 
the fact that cue validity in the study by Egly and colleagues was manipulated so 
that following a cue, targets appeared within the same object on 87.5% of trials.  
The existence and relative strength of these two possible prioritization 
mechanisms was explored in a two rectangle cuing paradigm similar to Egly et al. 
(1994).  Subjects were instructed to report the identity of a target letter (either a 
“T” or an “L”) located at the end of one of the two rectangles.  The strength of the 
configural grouping was manipulated by previewing the two objects for either 200 
or 1000 ms prior to cue.  The target-cue probabilities were manipulated so that 
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invalid different object cues were highly probable and invalid within object cues 
were less probable.  Longer preview times resulted in larger object based effects.  
These object based effects can be attenuated in situations in which cue-target 
probabilities are such that within-object prioritization affords no advantage for 
observers.  Taken together, the authors argue that previously demonstrated 
within-object advantages are likely due to both probabilistic guidance and 
configural cues. 
 The advantages that accrue for comparisons within objects have an 
analogue that appears when observers are instructed to make comparisons 
within an object part, as opposed to across objects parts.  Barenholtz & Feldman 
(2003) presented observers with patterned objects consisting of repeated curve 
segments.  Each object could be divided at concave curvature minima into 
several equivalently sized parts or regions.  Subjects indicated whether two small 
marks that appeared along the contour of these objects contained the same or a 
different number of peaks.  Subjects responded more rapidly when the two marks 
were presented along a contour of an object part.  When the two marks appeared 
on different parts of a given object, responses were not as rapid.  It should be 
noted that the contours were chosen such that within and between part 
comparisons both involved a comparison across an equivalent curve.  These 
results inform and complicate our previous discussion of object based attention.  
Specifically, they show a within-object within-part advantage, extending previous 
findings to groupings within objects. 
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 Taken together, there are four main explanations of within-object 
advantages (Brown & Denney, 2007).  Within the biased competition account 
(Vecera & Farah, 1994; Desimone & Duncan, 1995), when objects compete for 
representation, selection of one object in given a perceptual system, biases other 
systems to represent that same object.  When an observer attends to an object 
and responds to multiple features within that object, there is no need to change 
the top-down biasing signal that affords advantages to that object.  When an 
observer is forced to respond to features contained within two objects, a shift of 
attention between objects requires a new biasing signal to identify to the second 
object.  This results in a two object cost.  On the other hand, the prioritization 
account proposed by Shomstein and colleagues suggests that the within object 
advantage is the result of an inherent bias within the attentional system such that 
when a stimulus must be explored for features (due to positional uncertainty), the 
system checks locations within the currently attended object before shifting to a 
new object.  The attentional guidance account proposed by Avrahami and others 
argues that attention spreads automatically within perceptually organized 
structures, regardless of their object status.  In the final account presented by 
Brown & Denney (2007), object based effects are not due to a within-object 
advantage, but rather are the result of a between-object disadvantage.  When a 
comparison spans objects, attention must disengage from one object before 
engaging with a second.  This disengagement process is effortful and harms 
performance. 
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 There are situations in which the grouping of stimuli harms perceptual 
performance.  Rensink & Enns (1998) investigated the nature of preattentive 
grouping in visual search tasks.  Observers were presented with a shape 
combination search task in several conditions.  Targets either contained two 
shapes ordered in depth (with partial occlusion) or with a narrow strip of empty 
space between the two shapes.  When observers searched for the depth-ordered 
shapes, search was effortful and serial.  When the shapes were slightly 
separated, detection was facilitated, arguable due the increased distinctiveness 
of the shapes (the contour of the shapes in the absence of an occluder was more 
complex).  On the basis of these data, the authors argue that shape 
representations overcome occlusion in a rapid preattentive manner, and the 
subsequent search involves an exploration of the display space for a shape that 
is similar to distractors (due to the completion process).  Once these shapes are 
“filled in” by this completion process, access to their constituent features in 
limited. 
 Similarly, Davis and colleagues present evidence that the within-object 
advantage observed in the literature can be reversed in situations wherein the 
single large object contains more perceptual information than two smaller objects 
(Davis, Driver, Pavani, & Shepherd, 2000; Davis & Holmes, 2005).  Additionally, 
a modulation of object based effects was observed depending on the onset 
relationship between the object and the to-be-discriminated features.  When the 
features appeared at the same time as the objects, observers were actually 
faster comparing features between separate objects.  On the basis of these and 
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other related findings, Davis modifies the argument presented by Humphreys and 
Heinke (1998) and argues that: a) individual features are bound within objects 
using links based on parvocellular processes whereas features between objects 
are related on the basis of magnocellular processes and b) the number and 
strength of these within and between objects links, rather than the number of 
attended objects, underlies the within and between object effects observed.  
Manipulations of the distribution of information across spatial frequencies with 
concomitant changes in object based effects support this interpretation. 
 Several recent studies by Moore and colleagues have explored the role of 
perceptual organization in the control of the visual selection of objects.  These 
experiments draw on the attentional walk paradigm developed by Intriligator & 
Cavanagh (2001).  In this paradigm, subjects are presented with a collection of 
circular elements (disks) organized into a ring.  At the start of a trial, one of these 
element is indicated to be a starting point.  Following this initial cue, participants 
are given instructions to move the focus of their attention one element over to 
either the right or left.  This continues for some period of time.  Following this 
sequence of directional instructions, observers are tested to see how accurately 
they could individuate and select the target disk indicated by the initial cue and 
subsequent shift cues.  The spatial resolution of visual attention is assayed by 
manipulating the density of the disks.  Initial interpretations of performance 
limitations identified attentional resolution as the limiting factor in tracking 
performance.  Recent evidence indicates that performance is more likely limited 
by the precision of attentional control (Moore, Hein, Grosjean, and Rinkenauer,  
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2009).  The role of perceptual organization in the implementation of attentional 
control was investigated by Moore et al. (2009) in the following manner.  Subjects 
were presented with disks arrayed in a ring in alternating colors.  Depending on 
the presented tone, subjects were instructed to shift attention to either the left or 
right disk of the same color.  Because the disks were in alternating color order, 
this would involve a shift of two disks.  If the identically colored disks were 
grouped, and attentional selection occurs within these groups, then performance 
with 24 disk in alternating color order should be comparable to performance with 
12 disks.  Despite multiple grouping manipulations, including connecting like 
colored elements and organizing binocular displays so that like colored elements 
fall along the same depth plane (different from the depth plane of the dissimilarly 
colored disks), researchers found little evidence that perceptual organization 
could be used to guide attentional selection of the target disk.  The authors argue 
that the same grouping principles that facilitate attentional performance when 
observers are instructed to respond to multiple stimulus attributes can hurt 
performance when observers are required to individuate items.   
 Regardless of whether the effects of perceptual organization harmed or 
helped a particular attentive task, one can conclude that attentional control 
mechanisms are governed by systems that incorporate knowledge about the 
perceptual organization of one’s visual experiences.  Recent accounts of 
perceptual organization in scenes have emphasized the role of repeated 
exposures to patterned stimuli in the development of grouping rules (Fizer & 
Aslin, 2001; Fizer & Aslin, 2005).  The novel experiments presented in this paper 
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will investigate the role of abstract associative knowledge in the control of visual 
attention and demonstrate, in a manner analogous to these demonstrations of 
the influence of perceptual organization, that conceptual organization informs 
attention. 
 Locus of attentional selection.  Within the attentional literature a number 
of theoretical distinctions have been drawn identifying common attributes and 
distinct features of hypothetical attentional mechanisms.  Theories of attention 
can be organized a number of different ways, including the evaluated sensory 
modality, the selective mechanism and the locus of selection.  The following 
discussion will focus on the last of these distinctions. 
 Much early research focused on where in an information processing 
sequence attentional selection occurred.  Because information processing 
models of human cognitive performance emphasized the sequential operations 
involved in generating mental behavior and the capacity to conduct these 
operations is limited, attention was hypothesized to operate within or between 
distinct stages of cognition.  Indeed, in so far as distinct cognitive stages have 
associated modes of representation, much discussion centered around the types 
of perceptual representations and attributes that are available for attentional 
selection.  If the role of attention is to select the most important information 
available for elaborated processing following some sort of perceptual bottleneck, 
where in processing does this bottleneck emerge? 
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 Broadbent’s Filter model argued that perceptual and cognitive processing 
of a stimulus involves three distinct mechanisms (Broadbent, 1958).  First, 
information is registered in a high capacity, volatile sensory representation often 
referred to as iconic or sensory memory.  Information here is rich, but close to 
sensation and not elaborated in terms of meaning, goals, or other high-level 
factors.  Next, information is shunted from this high capacity buffer through a filter 
which permits only a portion of the available information through.  Attentional 
selection is fundamentally dichotomous, with selected information passed along 
unaltered and non-selected information ignored entirely.  Unattended information 
is unavailable for later, more elaborated treatment.  Further, he argued that the 
criteria available to these selective processes operated on largely early, sensory 
attributes.  On the basis of these physical properties alone, some information is 
allowed to pass and other information left unprocessed.  If true, this meant 
information could be selected on the basis of pitch, brightness, or loudness, but 
not its meaning.  Sensibly, Broadbent argued that, in order for attention to 
effectively pare down the mind’s computational burden, selection must occur 
before these limitations are manifest.  Performance limitations were thought to 
become greater later in processing, so selection likely occurred earlier in 
processing.  Following filtration, information is passed along to a detector which 
processes the information in a manner consistent with the stimulus’ meaning, the 
observer’s goals, etc. Because selection occurs early in processing, this class of 
models, as typified by Broadbent’s filter model, are referred to as early selection 
models. 
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 Early selection models have the advantage of making strong predictions 
regarding the fate of unattended stimuli .  Specifically, information about 
properties of an unattended stimulus that are thought to not emerge until late in 
processing, such as meaning, should be unavailable to the perceiver.  This 
prediction was disconfirmed by Moray (1959) is his famous demonstration of the 
“cocktail party effect.”  Observers were presented with a auditory stream 
containing a narrative they were to shadow while various types of information 
were presented in the unattended channel.  In one condition, observers were 
presented with a list of words that repeated 35 times.  Despite the numerous 
repetitions, they were unable to recall any of the words presented in the 
unattended channel.  Contrastingly, when observers were presented with their 
name in the unattended channel, they were able to recall this at the end of a 
given trial.  This suggests that, at least in certain circumstances, observers are 
able to process the meaning of an unattended message. 
 In order to accommodate this and related results, early selection models 
were modified to permit certain types of more advanced operations to be 
performed on unattended information.  At the risk of circularity, it should be clear 
that if the role of attention is to select some information for more elaborate 
processing while excluding other information, not all information is processed to 
the same extent.  Just how elaborate the processing of unattended information is 
has been studies extensively.  Models that permit advanced processing of 
unattended information are referred to as either intermediate or late selection 
models, largely depending on the complexity of unattended processing.  Models 
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that suggest only partial or incomplete processing of unattended stimuli, such at 
Treisman’s Attenuation model (1964), are referred to as intermediate selection 
models.  Descriptions of attentional processing which assert that unattended 
information is processed in a fairly elaborate manner are identified as late 
selection models (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963). 
 Considerable evidence has accrued that the meaning of unattended 
stimuli is accessed to some extent (Treisman, 1960; Moray, 1970; Lewis, 1970; 
MacKay, 1973).  The degree to which these stimuli are processed, however, 
remains unclear.  Kahneman & Treisman (1984) argued that discrepancies within 
the literature regarding the locus of selection reflect fundamentally different 
conceptualizations about what attention does.  Specifically, older research was 
grounded in a filtering paradigm which emphasized the exclusionary role of 
attention.  Demonstrating these effects often involved difficult tasks involving a 
number of cognitive systems which strained attentional control capabilities.  In 
contrast, recent work takes a selective set paradigm and generally involves 
simpler tasks.  This may make consolidating the contradictory literature on the 
fate of unattended stimuli difficult. 
 Recent evidence suggests that the degree to which unattended stimuli are 
processed depends on perceptual load, or the amount of information attention 
must filter (Lavie, 1995).  According to this perspective, attentional selection is 
only necessary when the amount of presented information exceeds the capacity 
of a limited bandwidth channel.  Studies which find processing of unattended 
information to a greater or lesser extent do so because the amount of information 
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presented exceeds the capacity of this channel by some varying amount.  
Interference paradigms, such as the Stroop task, are one way of measuring the 
extent to which unattended stimuli are processed.  Numerous studies have 
demonstrated that usually automatically processed, but unattended, stimuli are 
less likely to exhibit an interfering effect when perceptual load is high (Lavie, 
1995). 
Conclusions 
 This chapter provides a context for the following discussion of attentional 
capture by scenes related to a target object.  We have sampled perspectives that 
emphasize the role of attentional resources in the consolidation and elaboration 
of detailed object and scene representations.  These attentional resources can 
be directed in sophisticated ways that reflect an observer’s experiences.  The 
conceptual organization of objects and scene knowledge is hypothesized to 
direct visual attention in much the same way that the spatial organization of 
objects and scenes.  Specifically, the regularities of this knowledge is argued to 
direct and limit the allocation of visual attention during object recognition.  The 
following chapter will elaborate this hypothesis, showing its continuity with 
theories of contextual influences on object recognition. 
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Chapter 2: Object-Context Associations in Object Recognition 
 The current experiments test the hypothesis that observers involuntarily 
attend to contexts associated with the current target in an attentive task.  Of 
course, this claim has consequences for both our understanding of attention and 
object recognition.  This chapter will focus on the relationship between object 
recognition, object selection, and visual context. 
Direct Measures of Contextual Influences on Object Recognition   
 There is considerable evidence that contextual associations play a key 
role in object perception (Palmer, 1975; Biederman, Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 
1982; Bar & Ullman, 1994; Hollingworth & Henderson, 1999; Davenport & Potter, 
2004).  The role of visual context in object recognition has been a contentious 
issue.  Object recognition in general is poorly understood, so it is not surprising 
interacting factors are disputed.  The following discussion contains a sample of 
recent evidence and theory regarding contextual influences in object recognition, 
focusing primarily on the role of schematized context in object recognition.  The 
visual information that is typically encountered along with a focal object, including 
associated objects and typical spatial configurations, has been shown to 
influence recognition performance in a wide variety of object recognition tasks.  
This associated information has been referred to by a wide variety of terms 
including context frame, schema, gist, or scripts.  The same terms are employed 
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similarly to explain the role of pragmatic assumptions in psycholinguistics 
(Henderson & Ferreira, 2004).  In both cases the interpretation of an 
underdetermined stimulus, either an utterance or a scene, is constrained by a 
perceiver’s prior knowledge.  Because of the range of terms and rather loose 
definitions, in this paper I’ll refer to associated schematized contextual depictions 
as either an associated context or a related context.   
 For example, a schematic scene category might be “kitchen”.  A kitchen 
has typical visual properties, associated objects, and associated activities.  One 
would expect to see an oven but not a fire hydrant.  How these expectations 
shape selective processing of target items when the target’s identity is known in 
advance is uncertain.  Because human object recognition is performance is so 
effective, researchers typically have to either retroactively probe a degraded 
visual stimulus or measure the response time required for an observer to make 
some judgment about a stimulus.  The following examples fall under these two 
broad methodological categories.  However, generating models solely, or even 
primarily, on the basis of these two types of data will limit our understanding of 
the role of visual context for reasons described later.  
 In their influential papers, Hollingworth & Henderson (1998,1999) identify 
three possible relationships between contextual and object information during 
object recognition.  In each of the three cases, it is assumed that the scene is 
initially characterized in some sort of crude feed-forward initial categorization 
before the processing of individual objects proceeds.  There is considerable 
evidence that scene category information is available early in visual processing 
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(Greene & Oliva, 2008), possibly on the basis of low spatial frequency 
information (Bar, 2004).  In the first possibility, the contextual information is able 
to enhance the description of the target item, resulting in a genuine increase in 
sensitivity.  In this case, the features of the object that are diagnostic in the 
observer’s task are encoded more rapidly, less susceptible to interference, or 
easier to recall in the presence of associated contextual information.  
Alternatively, observers might simply modulate their standard of evidence 
depending on the context surrounding the item.  This biasing effect is a 
reasonable strategy in a world containing correlated objects and features.  In this 
case, observers would be more likely to recognize the refrigerator only because 
the associated context reduces the observers’ standard of evidence.  Observers 
still recognize objects in associated contexts more quickly and accurately, but 
would do so only because of their positive bias.  Lastly, it is possible that a scene 
has no influence on the recognition of objects.  In this functional isolation 
account, object recognition and scene recognition are largely independent 
processes. 
 Hollingworth & Henderson (2000) evaluated these possibilities by 
presenting observers with line drawings of common objects placed in drawn 
scenes.  The scenes were presented briefly and observers indicated whether 
particular items had been present in the initial display in a two alternative forced 
choice (2AFC).  The authors were careful to include trials where either both or 
neither of the two options provided were consistent with the overall scene.  If 
observers generate better mnemonic descriptions of objects appearing in an 
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associated context, they should be able to identify which of two schema-
consistent items was present in the display.  Alternatively, if observers are simply 
guessing on the basis of the overall scene schema, there should be false alarms 
for consistent items that are paired with inconsistent items in the forced choice 
following viewing.  Observers showed no advantage for semantically consistent 
objects when discriminating between pairs of consistent objects.  In fact, 
observers were actually more accurate when they were recognizing 
schematically inconsistent objects.  This is likely due to the fact that unexpected 
objects attract attention and receive more encoding.  The authors conclude that 
object recognition is isolated schematic scene constraints and previous 
demonstrations of such an effect were likely due to strategic guessing. 
  
Figure 1.  Line drawings showing schematic scenes and objects from 
Hollingworth & Henderson (1999) (Figure 1, p.325) 
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 Davenport and Potter (2004) provide evidence consistent with description 
enhancement through object-context consistency in an object naming task.  
Observers were presented with digitally manipulated photographs containing 
either a single central object against a consistent or inconsistent background.  
Immediately following a brief presentation of the photograph, observers were 
instructed to indicate the foreground object(s) or background with an open-ended 
response.  Observers identified the target item more accurately when it was 
consistent with the background.  For example, it was easier for observers to 
recognize a priest against a church interior background compared with a football 
field.  In a later experiment, Davenport (2007) demonstrated that this advantage 
for schema consistent objects did not depend on the number of foreground 
objects (1 or 2).  Additionally, in much the same way that context influenced the 
identification of objects, the foreground objects influenced the identification of the 
background.  Davenport advances an interactive account, similar to Bar’s (2004), 
where centrally presented objects and the scene background act as mutual 
constraints during dynamic cue extraction process.  This interactive model is in 
many ways analogous to the interactive-activation model of word recognition 
(McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982).  In this model of 
letter and word recognition, word, letter, and feature information are each 
processed simultaneously as partial information at each level is used to constrain 
and inform the search at other levels.  In much the same way, the foreground 
objects and background in the photographic scenes together determine an 
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integrated percept that is available for subsequent report.  Consonant with this 
account, there is evidence that inconsistent objects can affect scene 
categorization quite early in processing (Joubert, Fize, Rousselet, & Fabre-
Thorpe, 2008). 
  
Figure 2.  Digitally manipulated photographs showing a schema inconsistent 
object in scenes from Davenport & Potter  (2004) (Figure 1b, p.561) 
 Auckland, Cave, & Donnelly (2007) provide evidence of criterion 
modulation in an object recognition task embedded within flanking photographic 
distractors.  Observers were presented with an array of visual objects on each 
trial and then instructed to identify a target object in a 6 alternative forced choice 
discrimination.  Target objects were photographs of common items presented 
very briefly in the center of a square formed by the presentation of four additional 
flanking objects.  Together the central object and flankers formed a quincunx.  If 
the centrally presented item was a photograph of poker chips these flanking 
objects could be schematically consistent (playing cards) or schematically 
inconsistent (grapes) with the target item.  These additional photographic objects 
preceded the target object by either 104, 52, 0 ms, functioning as a variable 
onset prime of a sort.  After this lead time, the central object and four flanking 
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objects were visible for 52 ms, followed immediately by a six alternative forced 
choice discrimination.  The lures, or non-target items, in the forced choice on 
each trial were chosen to share either perceptual or semantic features with 
targets.  Additional choices were presented to prevent observers from 
strategically guessing the target on the basis of the options listed.  Observers 
were more accurate in their identification of the centrally presented object when it 
was preceded by surrounding schema consistent items.  This shows that the 
presentation of associated items enhances the perception of a target item, as 
has been shown in variety of other context cueing experiments.  However, only 
when the context preceded the target item did these benefits obtain, suggesting 
that the contextual information is most useful when the observer is getting ready 
to encode the target item.  In this sense, the results support a criterion 
modulation account.  It’s not the case that observers were actually able to see 
schematically consistent items better in the presence of related information or 
performance for the objects sharing a common onset with the distractors would 
have been influenced.  When observers were presented with contextual items 
before the target, observers did better with consistent items. 
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Figure 3.  Photographic objects surrounded by associated and unassociated 
objects from Auckland, Cave, & Donnelly (2007) (Figure 1, p. 333) 
 Indirect measures of contextual influence.  Each of the previous three 
examples measured object recognition performance in the presence or absence 
of associated contextual information.  The relationship between objects and 
associated contexts can be tested in other, less direct, ways.  The following 
examples describe the influence of object and context relationships on the 
allocation of visual attention without an overt object recognition task. 
 In recent demonstrations of the importance of object-scene associations in 
the deployment of visual attention, Gordon (2004, 2006) presented subjects with 
line drawings of natural scenes for a range of very short durations. Located within 
these scenes were objects that were either consistent or inconsistent with the 
schema of the scene.  Immediately after the scene offset a single spatial probe 
appeared, and subjects were to respond as quickly as possible.  If the schematic 
relationship between an object and the contextual scene influences visual 
attention, one would anticipate differences in response time depending on 
whether the spatial probe appeared behind a consistent or inconsistent item (but 
see Schmukle, 2005 for discussion of dot probe reliability).  For inconsistent 
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stimuli, only one object would violate schematic expectations.  In order to ensure 
that subjects did not strategically attend schematically inconsistent objects on 
trials containing schema violations, catch trials were included.  Catch trials, 
where the spatial probe appeared at fixation, represented 1/3 of all trials.  This 
ensured that observers did not strategically attend to either consistent or 
inconsistent items.  On all non-catch trials, the probe was placed at the location 
of a schema consistent or schema inconsistent object.   Gordon measured the 
time required for observers to respond to the spatial probe.  He assumed that 
observers would respond to the spatial probe more rapidly when it appeared 
behind the current focus of their attention.  Further, by manipulating the exposure 
duration of the scene, differences in attentional allocation can be measured as 
they evolve in time. 
 An inconsistent object advantage first emerged approximately 150 ms 
after stimulus onset. That is, when the scenes contained an schema inconsistent 
object, it wasn’t until the scene had been visible for 150 ms that observers 
showed different response times towards spatial probes appearing behind 
schema consistent or schema inconsistent items.  Because these scenes were 
presented for durations under the 200 ms required to plan and execute a 
saccade, inconsistent objects must be identified and treated differently from 
consistent objects in a single fixation.  This does not necessarily imply that 
inconsistent objects are processed with any priority. Rather, Gordon suggests 
that after schema consistent objects are identified, resources may be allocated to 
schema inconsistent objects.  
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 The allocation of attention to consistent and inconsistent objects was 
explored further in a negative priming paradigm. In this experiment, subjects 
were presented with scenes with consistent and inconsistent objects immediately 
followed by a stem-completion task.   In stem-completion tasks, observers are 
presented with an incomplete word (e.g. “toa_ _ _ _”) and instructed to fill in the 
blanks to form the first word that comes to mind that is consistent with the 
completed portion of the word.  In this experiment, subjects were less likely 
complete a word stem with a consistent object if the scene with the consistent 
object also contained an inconsistent object.  For example, if observers were 
presented with a kitchen scene containing a fire hydrant, they would be less likely 
to complete the item “toa_ _ _ _” than if observers viewed a kitchen scene with 
no inconsistent items.  
 This prioritization of semantically inconsistent objects within one fixation is 
replicates previous research indicating that semantically inconsistent objects are 
generally more likely to be attended. Hollingworth & Henderson (2000) found that 
subjects were more likely to detect changes in a change blindness paradigm 
when the changes were made to semantically informative objects. Objects were 
considered semantically informative when they were inconsistent with the 
schema for the scene. Semantically consistent objects are not considered 
informative individually because they all have equal diagnostic content. Further 
research demonstrated an inconsistent object advantage even when the 
influence of eye movements were controlled, suggesting that inconsistent objects 
are preferentially encoded.  Within the memory schema hypothesis proposed, 
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semantically consistent objects are set to their default schema value, but 
inconsistent objects are stored more accurately.  Regardless of the specifics of 
scene semantic relation processing, this finding is helpful in our discussion of 
contextual influences in object recognition.  These data indicate that in as little as 
150 ms the semantic properties of many illustrated scene objects can be 
extracted, a scene can be categorized, and the locations of schema-inconsistent 
objects can be selected. 
 Gronau, Neta, & Bar (2008) demonstrate both the importance of object-
context relationships and provide some hints about possible neural mechanisms 
in an object recognition priming study.  Observers were instructed to indicate on 
each trial whether an image represented a real or imaginary object.  This task is 
considered an indirect measure of object recognition because observers were 
not instructed to make a decision regarding the actual identity of the target 
object, but simply to determine whether or not it existed.  Immediately preceding 
the presentation of this target item, a priming object was presented.  The 
associative relationship between the priming object and the target object was 
structured so that the prime was either related or unrelated.   Further, the specific 
configuration in which these items were presented was designed to be either 
random or reflect the typical configuration of the items.  For example, if the target 
object and prime were related and presented in a typical configuration, one might 
see an oven followed by a pot immediately above it.  Spatial and semantic 
congruency were manipulated factorially.  Subject responded faster to true 
objects when they followed semantically associated prime objects at a spatially 
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typical location.  The interaction of semantic and spatial congruency conditions is 
argued to support an account wherein contextual influences in perception arise 
through context frames (Bar, 2004).  Described from a cognitive perspective, 
context frames are hypothesized to be integrated representations of objects and 
associated contextual details that are derived from experience.  These 
prototypical representations of particular contexts (e.g. kitchen) include 
information about a scene’s associated objects, typical configuration, and regular 
activities.  Hemodynamic activity monitored via fMRI indicated that activity was 
concentrated in the inferior prefrontal cortex and lateral occipital cortex while 
subjects completed this object discrimination task.  These two areas figure 
centrally within Bar’s larger model of the influence of context on object 
recognition 
  
Figure 4.  The priming and target stimuli employed by Gronau, Neta, & Bar 
(2008), (Fig 1b, p.375) 
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 A model of object recognition using contextual information.  Bar 
(2004) has developed a detailed neurocomputational model to describe the 
influence of context on object recognition with extensive psychophysiological and 
behavioral support (Bar & Aminoff, 2003; Bar, Aminoff, & Schacter, 2008).  
Within this interactive account of object recognition, when observers glance at a 
scene, an initial lowpass characterization of the image is propagated rapidly and 
in parallel across the visual field through fast acting magnocellular visual 
pathways.  This lowpass scene is then categorized in the inferior prefrontal 
cortex (iPFC).  This process is efficient and seems to utilize global, statistical 
properties of the scene (Greene & Oliva, 2009).  This initial guess of the scene 
category is coarse, but can begin to bias object recognition processes towards 
outcomes consistent with the scene category.  At the same time as this scene 
category processing is going on, observers are using ventral visual pathways to 
resolve object details.  These scene and object categorization processes are 
going on I qn parallel under conditions of mutual constraint.  The neural interface 
that mediates this interaction is located in the parahippocampal cortex.  These 
areas are long associated with episodic, layout, and scene memory.  Two 
specific parahippocampal regions, the parahippocampal place area and 
retrosplenial cortex, are argued to mediate the interaction between the iPFC and 
candidate object representations in the inferior temporal cortex.   
 Bar’s model efficiently summarizes a wealth of object recognition data, but 
does not make clear predictions in situations where task information specifies 
relevant objects or regions in a scene in any detailed sense.  Itti & Arbib (2005) 
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describe a conceptual model of object and scene comprehension with a 
significant role for these task factors.  Within the Salience, Vision, and Symbolic 
Schemas (SVSS) account, interactions between long-term memory (LTM), short-
term memory (STM), and various topographic representations of a two 
dimensional scene support complex, linguistically focused scene cognition.  A 
more detailed description of the model is presented following the next section. 
 In each of the previous experiments, the influence of context on object 
recognition was assessed using an object recognition task where the target 
category was not known to the participants in advance.  In the present 
experiments, observers will be searching for a category specified on a each trial.  
The way in which contextual associations might influence object recognition in 
these experiments is less certain.   
Contextual Associations in Visual Search 
 In the previous section’s studies, observers’ ability to rapidly identify an 
object was influenced by scene context.  Observers were required to either 
identify an object out of a list of alternatives, to freely recall the name of an 
object, or identify an image as an object or non-object.  In none of these cases 
are observers looking for a precued object.  Since the present experiments 
addresses the role of visual context in visual search for a known target, rather 
than recollection, let us turn our focus to object-context associations in visual 
search. 
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 Contextual cueing.  Demonstrations of contextual cueing measure the 
gradual build up of contextual associations regarding the location of a target 
object.  Chun & Jiang (1998) presented observers with a visual search task 
containing arrays of oriented letters.  Unbeknownst to the observers, some of the 
visual search displays were presented multiple times.  While performance 
improved for both novel and repeated displays, there were savings beyond 
general task learning associated with particular repeated displays.  Contextual 
cueing is generally assumed to reflect the gradual extraction of local configural 
properties surrounding the target (Brady & Chun, 2007) although recent accounts 
pointed towards decisional factors (Kunar, Flusberg, Horowitz, & Wolfe, 2007; 
Schankin & Schubo, 2010).   A configural representation is argued to guide 
attention towards locations where targets appeared previously.  Intriguingly, 
observers are often unaware of the repetition manipulation and cannot 
distinguish novel from repeated displays in an explicit recognition test.  
 While generally approached using sparse displays of basic elements, 
recent demonstrations of contextual cueing have used real-world photographic 
scenes (Brockmole & Henderson, 2006).  Observers were presented with 
photographic scenes containing an small oriented letter.  Some scenes were 
repeated while others were only presented once.  Observers demonstrated faster 
responses to targets located in repeated scenes compared with novel.  In this 
case, observers were able to explicitly recognize the repeated scene.  Observers 
demonstrated a smaller contextual cueing effect when the scenes were inverted.  
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Apparently the more meaningful background of the upright stimuli allowed 
observers to retain target locations more successfully. 
This semantic effect in contextual cueing was explored further by Goujon, 
Didierjean, Marmeche (2007).  Observers were presented with a numerical 
search task in arrays containing a distributed set of arabic numerals.  In typical 
contextual cueing experiments the overall or local configuration of items predicts 
the target location.  In these experiments, properties of the numbers which 
comprised the display predicted the target location.  It was demonstrated that the 
repetition of particular numbers or number category (“odd” vs. “even”) could be 
associated by the observer with a particular target location.  It is important to 
emphasize that the parity of the presented numbers, not their spatial 
configuration, that predicted the target location.  However, as with traditional 
contextual cueing, observers were unable to verbalize this target associated 
information. 
 Models of contextual influences on scene search.  Torralba, Oliva, 
Castelhano, & Henderson (2006) investigated how these contextual associations 
might be used in natural scene exploration.  Within Torralba and colleagues 
contextual guidance model, observers’ eye movements are guided by both local 
saliency and priors based on previous exposures to the target object.  For 
example, if observers were searching for a pedestrian in an image, it would be 
reasonable for them to be located somewhere along the ground plane.  The 
location of the ground plane is extracted through a holistic process that detects 
statistical regularities in the image and generates candidate locations.  This map 
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of candidate locations is then integrated with an activation map based on local 
salience.  This combined representation is used to direct eye movements within a 
scene.  When observers are instructed to visually explore photographic scenes 
for verbally labeled objects, their fixations are predicted by the spatially licensed, 
schematically expected locations of the target objects (Torralba, Oliva, 
Castelhano, & Henderson, 2006; Malcolm & Henderson, 2010). 
 Taken together, these studies indicate that observers are able to deploy 
visual attention in a way that reflects the regularities of their experience.  
Participants’ knowledge about probable target locations enhanced performance 
in these search tasks.  However, scene knowledge is not limited to the patterned 
location of targets in visual search displays, but includes information about more 
complex scene relationships.  One account of how general scene knowledge 
might be employed to answer particular questions about a scene is provided by 
Itti and Arbib (2005).  As mentioned previously the SVSS conceptual model 
describes how task knowledge might inform high-level scene perception.  
Schematic knowledge in LTM is used to generate and evaluate hypotheses 
about a scene that are used in generating verbal scene descriptions.   While the 
model describes both how observers might answer questions about a visual 
scene and how they might describe it, we’ll only focus on the way that incoming 
sensory information is evaluated for relevance against a task representation. 
 Central to the Itti and Arbib account of scene cognition is a construct 
known as the minimal subscene.  The minimal subscene is comprised of those 
elements within a scene judged to be relevant to the current scene task.  This 
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subset of objects are evaluated relative to a central anchoring element in the 
scene.  This anchoring element can be an object, agent, and action.  The 
particular minimal subscene constructed by a given observer will be determined 
by his or her task.  Not only would different observers construct different minimal 
subscenes while viewing the same scene with different goals, the minimal 
subscene of a given observer changes over time as additional scene information 
is extracted and goals are refined.  This minimal subscene exists in short-term 
memory and acts as an interface between long-term scene knowledge and 
various spatial representations of the scene.  The minimal subscene is 
hypothesized to play a central role mediating concrete perceptual 
representations and symbolic/linguistic representation of the scene. 
 The control of this minimal subscene extraction process is grounded in 
models of distributed, schematic control processes.  A library of schemas are 
stored in long-term memory and sampled on the basis of task representations.  
Then, these active schemas interact within short-term memory to generate 
descriptions of the scene.  A variety of schematic description mechanisms 
operate simultaneously and cooperatively as observers sample objects and 
features for the minimal subscene. These schemas are complex and contain not 
only mechanisms that represent visual features, but also control the feature 
extraction process, assert claims regarding other regions of the visual field, and 
maintain a confidence level regarding assigned labels. 
 Given the range of possible scenes and the vast amount of schematic 
scene knowledge in LTM, optimal scheduling of these schemas becomes a 
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thorny computational issue.  Here Itti & Arbib suggest attention has a central role 
in scene understanding.  Attention not only controls the prioritization of locations 
in a visual task, but also the types of features and objects to be attended in those 
locations.  In this sense, attention directs not only the sampling of schemas from 
LTM but also the organization of the sampled schema instances in STM.  
However, the control of this cooperatively computational process is distributed 
and emerges only through the interaction multiple simultaneously active object 
schemas. 
 The iterative steps of the SVSS model are as follows.  When observers 
plan on answering a particular question about a scene, there is a preparatory 
task biasing which prioritizes certain types of visual information before the scene 
is viewed.  Once the scene is visible, observers extract features from the scene 
and construct on the basis of these features a verbal label for the scene (gist), 
salience maps describing local feature contrast, and task-relevance maps that 
prioritize scene regions on the basis of observer goals.  This feature extraction 
and activation map construction process, is followed by recognition of particular 
items within the display.  Once an item has been recognized, observers update 
scene representations to incorporate this additional information.   
 Preparatory task biasing primes or sensitizes both perceptual and 
conceptual representations in STM.  This sampling of schemas from LTM into 
STM is accomplished on the basis of both explicit task instructions and 
associations in long term memory.  For example, if an observer was instructed to 
determine whether a scene contained a goldfish, they would sample not only 
 56!
goldfish schemas from LTM but also fish tank schemas.  Once these candidate 
objects are active in STM, they can be compared with particular items and 
regions in the sequence determined by the overall attention activation map. 
 The overall activation map in turn is determined by the integration of a 
task relevance map (TRM) and salience maps.  The TRM describes the regions 
of the scene that are germane to observer’s goals as they view the scene 
(Navalpakkam & Itti, 2003).  The TRM integrates information regarding the 
target’s local features, the scene gist, and the scene layout into a single 
topographic activation map.  For example, if an observer is looking for humans 
walking on a beach, activation will be higher for regions containing roughly 
elliptical shapes with a vertical primary axis.  Knowledge of the category of scene 
(beach) and the layout of the scene (looking out into the water) would direct 
resources towards locations in the lower visual field near the shoreline.  The 
TRM that integrates these pieces of information is then combined with a salience 
map to form a final map that guides attention.  The TRM does not contain 
detailed information about the objects found in these locations, but simply a 
prioritization of different regions that can be used to schedule detailed visual 
analysis. 
 The SVSS model describes how observers might extract task relevant 
information from complex visual scenes using a collection of schematized object 
descriptions under distributed control.  This distributed control system manages 
the scheduling of perceptual tasks using both perceptual and conceptual 
knowledge.  For the current experiments, this model would suggest that when 
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observers are searching for a known target item, they use a complex of schemas 
which likely includes information about associated contexts.  The model does not 
make detailed predictions regarding the extent to which this schema selection 
process is under the control of the observer.  Can observers select a narrow set 
of schemas that prioritize only information closely associated with the target and 
task or is this process automatic?  Itti & Arbib suggest that the schema for a 
target not only includes where to look but also how to look.  To what extent is this 
latter type of schematic information sensitive to a particular task?  That is, if 
observers are looking for an object and are presented with an associated context 
that, in the experimental setting, never contains the target object do observers 
still attend to this associated, schematic context?  The current experiments 
indicate that observers experience difficulty excluding this associated contextual 
information.  The next section will review key findings in the high-level attentional 
control literature consistent with this claim. 
Attention and Temporal Limits in Perception 
 If observers do use contextual scene knowledge in the allocation of visual 
attention, this requires that scene knowledge must be available rapidly and with 
minimal cognitive investment.  The following section reviews the evidence that 
these conditions are met. 
 Attention and conceptual short-term memory.  For contextual features 
to guide the visual selection of objects, the mechanisms governing ACS would 
have to be relatively flexible.  These control mechanisms would have to be 
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malleable in two respects.  First, given that contextual associations are formed 
on the basis of an observer’s experiences, attentional mechanisms would need 
to be able to gradually change over time to reflect these regularities.  As 
mentioned, in much the same way that spatial attention reflects the laws of 
perceptual organization, higher order attentional systems are governed by higher 
order perceptual and conceptual knowledge.  Second, observers would need to 
be able to control the activation of these contextual associations so that only task 
relevant associations are active at a time (Bar, 2004).  A variety of research 
programs evaluating visual attention demonstrate a remarkable degree of 
flexibility in both of these senses.  The following experiments are a sampling of 
recent findings in this exciting new research area. 
 The selection of stimuli according to abstract, conceptual criteria is 
predicted by the conceptual short-term memory hypothesis (Potter, 1976; Potter, 
1993). Potter argues that fleeting conceptual representations of objects and 
features are ubiquitous in mental processes and emphasizes their role in fairly 
basic perceptual operations. Conceptual short-term memory (CSTM) putatively 
acts as an interface between perception and long-term memory, permitting 
volatile candidate conceptual representations to be compared with durable 
mnemonic traces. When an object is successfully associated with structures in 
long-term memory, a lasting representation is constructed that is available for 
free report and the guidance of behavior. The mechanisms of CSTM are 
implicated in wide variety of tasks including reading, object and scene 
perception. Critical to our current discussion, the activated concepts in CSTM are 
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integrated both with each other and associated items in LTM. In one 
demonstration of the heterogeneous nature of these memories, polysemous 
words temporarily activate multiple possible meanings before contextual 
constraints bias selection towards semantically consistent possibilities (Swinney, 
1979). CSTM mechanisms are not restricted to the representation and 
sustenance of these temporary representations, but are hypothesized to play an 
active role in the construction of elaborate multidimensional durable mnemonic 
objects.  In terms of psychological processes, CSTM is active between the 
identification of an object and its consolidation into visual short term memory.  
CSTM would be well suited to process information available in a single fixation.   
 The strongest evidence for CSTM is presented by Potter (1975, 1976). 
Participants viewed rapidly presented photographic scenes after being provided 
with a verbal label or picture of some target object.  After viewing sequences of 
images at speeds of around 100 ms / item, subjects were able to quite reliably 
detect the target image in the sequence. Intriguingly, accuracies for either verbal 
labels or an actual preview of the target image were comparable (although later, 
a picture target advantage obtained), suggesting that whatever memory system 
was involved in the detection of the target image in the sequence relies on 
relatively abstract representations quite effectively. When subjects were not cued 
to the target category and simply given a recognition test regarding the same 
target image, accuracy was much lower.   
 This vulnerability of uncued, briefly viewed images to interference by 
preceding and succeeding images is referred to as conceptual masking. 
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Conceptual masking is distinct from perceptual masking because it involves 
interference during, as opposed to prior to, the identification stage (Intraub, 1984; 
Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2000).  The vulnerability of these memories was tested 
directly by Potter and colleagues (Potter, Staub, Rado, & OʼConnor, 2002). 
Observers were presented with an RSVP stream followed by a recognition task, 
as in the previously discussed experiments. The nature and timing of the 
recognition test following the RSVP sequence was manipulated. When observers 
were required to wait several seconds between viewing the RSVP sequence and 
attempting to recognize individually presented items, observer performance 
declined as a function of the interval. As one might expect, performance also 
declined across the recognition test, such that accuracy was highest for items at 
the beginning of the list. Intriguingly, there was no recency effect in terms of the 
RSVP sequence. Items late in a given image stream were no more likely to be 
correctly recognized than those at the beginning. This supports prior work 
showing that once a picture is no longer being processed because a subsequent 
image is being viewed, it is not any more or less subject to interference as more 
and more images are processed (Potter, 1976). In a second series of 
experiment, the authors presented observers with the same RSVP recognition 
task (Potter, Staub, OʼConnor, 2004). The conceptual relationship between the 
old items and the lures was manipulated in order to determine whether picture 
recognition accuracy is supported more by semantic or conceptual properties as 
opposed to the featural details of the memorized images. The hypothesized 
relationship between these multiple memory systems was as following. Both 
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CSTM and PSTM (pictorial short-term memory) are active on the order of several 
seconds. Over time, the detailed visual information, contained in PSTM, is lost, 
leaving only the CSTM information. The information in CSTM must either be 
matched with items in long-term memory and tokenized into a durable 
representation or it will be lost. Items that are tokenized successfully are 
available for report for longer periods of time.  Observers were presented with 
both actual photographs and verbal labels during the recognition test portion of 
the experiment. The serial position of true and false items within the presented 
recognition lists was manipulated. The authors present comparable recognition 
performance with both verbal and photographic probes in many conditions, with 
an overall advantage for picture probes. While conceptually related lures were 
more likely to be falsely recognized, the strength of the effect diminished over the 
course of the recognition test, suggesting the activated CSTM representations 
faded over the course of testing.   
 The role of CSTM extends beyond picture perception, however, and may 
also support various types of verbal behavior (Potter, 1999). It has been 
hypothesized that the recall of sentences longer than an individualʼs short-term 
memory word span may involve temporarily active traces in long term memory. 
Within this account, as a listener hears a sentence words are entered to the 
standard modal phonological loop. At the same time, the meaning of these words 
are extracted via CSTM and selectively activate matching items in long-term 
memory. When the sentence is recalled, the activated lexical items in long term 
memory are more likely to be sampled because of their recruitment by CSTM. 
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Observers in this study were presented with individual words from sentences at 
rates up to 10 Hz, much faster than phonological encoding speeds.  Potter 
argues that CSTM must be somehow distinct from the types of conceptual 
representations available in long term memory, because participants are able to 
associate a given conceptual representation to the current circumstances. Stated 
alternatively, the memory system must create a token for a given mnemonic 
object apart from the type information used to label the token. This token, which 
is quite similar to an object file, is argued to contain pointers information in LTM 
(both the type and its associates) as well as contextual and episodic information. 
Under the proper circumstances this CSTM representation may reach awareness 
and be available for subsequent report over some time interval. 
 In terms of our current discussion of semantic ACS, it has been 
hypothesized that CSTM may play a role in the guidance of visual attention 
(Belke et al., 2008). CSTM representations are available on a timescale that 
would permit their use in selecting fixation locations. The relative efficiency and 
minimal cognitive investment involved in the creation of these memories is 
another attractive feature of this system.  The following experiments report recent 
findings regarding attentional capture by conceptual features. 
 Rapid access to affective information.  Influential researchers argue 
that since selective attention is used to pare down the wash of data across the 
senses and emotional significance often marks biologically important data, it is 
likely the mind uses emotional significance to identify objects that ought to be 
attended (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993).  The direction of attention 
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toward affective targets involves ACS just as much as any other attentive 
behavior.  Generally speaking, emotional ACS involve control parameters and 
target representations over which the observer has little control.  For example, 
participants have been shown to fixate attractive opposite-sex conspecifics in a 
manner largely independent of currently active goals or tasks (Duncan, Park, 
Faulkner, Schaller, Neuberg, & Kenrick, 2008).  Here we have a predictable and 
complex attentive behavior (fixation) that occurs on the basis of a relatively 
sophisticated perceptual evaluation (attractiveness) outside of an individual’s 
control.  The rapid processing of emotional stimuli are another domain where the 
rapid access to high-level perceptual and conceptual information seems to 
proceed in a manner insensitive to manipulations that usually strain visual 
attention. 
 Emotional reactions to stimuli almost always involve the furthering or 
impeding of some biological goal (Arnold, 1960).  In order for emotional tagging 
of stimuli to have any utility in rapid deployment of selective attention, emotional 
processing of affective stimuli would need to occur quite quickly (Compton, 
2003). Evidence from electrophysiological studies indicate brain activity in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex 150ms after stimulus (spider image) onset 
(Carriete, Mercado, Tapia & Hinojosa, 2004). The ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
is believed to be involved in threat processing. In this study the threatening 
stimuli were masked and the participants had no awareness of the threatening 
stimuli.  Psychophysiological studies which monitored biological indicators of 
threat detection (e.g. blood pressure, skin conductance, heart rate, corrugator 
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activity) found a similar rapid response, with reliable changes within 500 ms of 
stimulus onset (Codispoti, Bradley, & Lang, 2001). Codispoti and colleagues 
presented stimuli to participants for 500 ms and found similar patterns of 
emotionally linked physiological response as previous studies in which stimuli 
were presented for 6 s. It would seem as though biological preparedness for 
threats reaches asymptote quickly, remaining stable after the first 500 ms. 
Researchers argue that this indicates that stimuli continue to be processed even 
after presentation. It seems that not only the central nervous system, but the 
peripheral nervous system as well, can respond to emotional stimuli in well under 
one second. This window of time that would permit selective attention to utilize 
emotional significance as a source of information in situations that would require 
rapid responses. 
 Lesion studies involving bilateral simultaneous stimulation provide 
converging evidence that threat-related stimuli are preferentially processed 
(Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 2001). Two subjects with right parietal focal lesions 
demonstrated extinction of briefly presented stimuli in their left visual field. 
However, when images of spiders were presented in the left visual field, subjects 
were able to correctly identify images as accurately as controls. It should be 
noted that the spiders were matched with flowers in terms of low-level visual 
properties by rearranging the lines in the illustration. 
Emotional salience engages attention. Codispoti, Bradley, & Lang (2001) 
presented participants with an abrupt auditory probe while they were presented 
with affective stimuli. The typical response to a 50 ms presentation of a 103 dB 
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tone is a startle response, which almost always entails a blink. By measuring 
blink suppression, researchers hoped to evaluate attentional involvement with 
the affective stimuli. Blinks were inhibited longer for emotionally valenced, either 
pleasant or unpleasant, stimuli. However, when subject did blink, the magnitude 
of the startle reflex was greater when participants were presented with negative, 
as opposed to positive or neutral, stimuli. Similar results obtained in a study by 
Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, McManis, & Lang (2001). Researchers concluded 
that affective information is used to modulate the startle reflex, leading to 
heightened startle reactions in the presence of negative, or threatening, stimuli. 
Other evidence for a strong relationship between emotion and attention can be 
found in a study by Anderson & Phelps (2001). Using a rapid serial visual 
presentation paradigm, researchers determined that the attentional blink is 
attenuated when the second target is emotionally salient. This attenuation was 
not evident in a participant with damage to the amygdala. 
 A recent study by Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco (2006) may further illuminate 
this relationship between attention and emotion. In an investigation of transient, 
covert attention, researchers presented participants with an orientation 
discrimination task using gabor patches of varying contrast. The patches could 
be primed by a fearful or a neutral face in the center of the screen. Participants 
had lower contrast thresholds when presented with the frightened, as opposed to 
the neutral face. In a second experiment participants were presented with a 
neutral or fearful face cue in either a peripheral location or distributed about the 
screen. The location of the peripheral cue changed across trials. Participants had 
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lower contrast thresholds with the frightened faces in both the peripheral and 
distributed conditions. Interestingly, these results show independent contributions 
of emotion and spatial attention, such that the peripheral cue, in the quadrant of 
the screen where the target was to appear, resulted in the lower contrast 
threshold than the distributed cue, likely because the distributed cue spread 
attention evenly about the screen. However, the distributed fearful cue still 
resulted in lower thresholds when compared to the distributed neutral cue. 
Researchers conclude that reciprocal projections from the amygdala, which 
processes threats preattentively, loop back to the early visual areas of the 
extrastriate cortex, increasing the speed and accuracy of visual processing. 
Additionally, while the effects of emotion on perception may come about in this 
experiment via the moderating influence of transient, covert attention, there is 
evidence that emotion may have a potentiating effect on visual processing even 
in the absence of attention. When the cue was distributed evenly across the 
screen, so there was no cue for covert attention to use to localize the target, 
there still were lower contrast thresholds. This study utilized fearful faces 
because fearful faces provide ambiguous information  about the environment. 
The information about the environment is ambiguous in so far as it signals a 
threat, but does not identify it. 
 Evolutionary psychological arguments for the advantage that affective 
stimuli obtain are numerous.  Theorists have identified a number of domains in 
which emotion may have influenced fitness, but of particular interest are the 
areas of attention, perception, and learning.  Explicit criteria have been 
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formulated to define the boundaries within which an emotion can be accurately 
labeled as an adaptation (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). For an emotion to be 
considered an adaptation, ancestral populations found themselves presented 
with a situation with great enough frequency as to constitute an “adaptive 
problem.” This situation must be identifiable by situation-specific cues. 
Additionally, these cues must be monitored by algorithms that detect situations 
and then react in a manner that increases fitness.  Threats in the environment 
were present in abundance and constituted an adaptive problem. Moreover, 
these dangerous situations can be sometimes be quickly detected utilizing visual 
cues. 
 While traditional explanations of perceptual advantages for affective 
stimuli relied on evolutionary arguments, recent evidence suggests that the 
categories of affective stimuli that these stimulus categories can be learned.  
Blanchette (2006) presented observers with a visual search task containing 
various affective targets.  Observers were presented with threatening objects that 
might have been encountered in a humans’ evolutionary environment of 
adaptation (e.g. snakes, spiders) as well as those that represent novel 
developments in material culture (e.g. syringes, guns).  Subjects were instructed 
to indicate whether any of the 4 or 9 objects presented did not share category 
membership with the distractors.  As one might expect, an advantage for 
negative stimuli obtained, such that when they were the discrepant items 
observers responded more rapidly.  Critically for our current discussion, this 
effect was greater for artifactual threats than evolutionary threats.  In a second 
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experiment, participants were presented with the same task and stimulus 
categories, but instead of presenting photographs, cartoons of the object 
categories were employed.  Despite the lack of verisimilitude, observers again 
demonstrated an advantage for artifactual threatening objects over biological 
threats.  These data suggest that the mechanisms involved with the detection 
and localization of threat related information in the environment are not as hard 
wired as initially posited. 
 In a recent methodologically novel demonstration of access to the 
semantic attributes of heavily masked French words, observers were tasked with 
the identification of neutral and emotional word stimuli (Gaillard, De Cul, 
Naccache, Vinckier, Cohen, & Dehaene, 2006).  These experiments were 
designed to measure the effects of both familiarity and meaning.  Familiarity was 
manipulated by presenting the words repeatedly with increasing or decreasing 
mask durations.  This allowed the researchers to test identification performance 
on the same words with the same mask duration under conditions where subject 
either had or had not consciously perceived the word.  As one might expect, 
familiarity increased the accuracy of word identification, allowing observers to 
report words with very short target mask asynchronies.  Of greater importance for 
the current discussion was the result of the semantic manipulation.  Observers 
reported emotionally charged words more often and more accurately than control 
words.  This was the case both when observers had recently consciously seen 
the word (in the increasing masking condition) and when observers had not 
recently consciously seen the word.  Great pains were taken by the researchers 
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to control all relevant word statistics (orthographic neighborhood density, 
frequency, etc.).  In many cases, identification benefits accrued for emotional 
words which differed from control stimuli in only one letter (danger vs. ranger).  
 In all these experiments, we see participants able to rapidly make 
relatively abstract, conceptual characterizations of linguistic and photographic 
stimuli.  This suggests that early attentional filtering mechanisms are capable of 
making sophisticated categorizations, relying on long-term knowledge about 
objects and the world. 
 Rapid processing of scene semantics.  As mentioned previously, 
evidence that semantic factors can influence scene processing within a single 
fixation is presented by Gordon (2004, 2006). This prioritization of semantically 
inconsistent objects within one fixation is consonant with previous research 
indicating that semantically inconsistent are generally more likely to be attended. 
Hollingworth & Henderson (2000) found that subjects were more likely to detect 
changes in a change blindness paradigm when the changes were made to 
semantically informative objects. Objects were considered semantically 
informative when they were inconsistent with the schema for the scene. 
Individual semantically consistent objects are not considered informative 
because they all point to the same scene category. Further research 
demonstrated an inconsistent object advantage even when the influence of eye 
movements were controlled, suggesting that inconsistent objects are 
preferentially encoded.  Within the memory schema hypothesis proposed, 
semantically consistent objects are set to their default schema value, but 
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inconsistent objects are stored more accurately.  Regardless of these details 
regarding the processing of scene semantic properties and their relations, this 
finding is helpful in our discussion of semantic ACS because it indicates that the 
semantic properties of many illustrated scene objects can be rapidly extracted, a 
scene categorization can be made, and the location of the schema-inconsistent 
objects can be determined in as little as 150 ms.  
  In another demonstration of rapid, seeming pre-attentive processing of 
photographic scenes, Li, VanRullen, Koch, Perona (2005) conducted an 
investigation into rapid scene categorization while subjects simultaneously 
performed an unrelated task.  Subjects were presented with sequences of letters 
centrally and were instructed to make same different categorizations.  In the 
dual-task condition, images were presented simultaneously at varying degrees of 
eccentricity.  Subjects were presented with scene categorization tasks consisting 
of facial gender, animal detection, and vehicle detection.  Several control tasks 
using synthetic stimuli were also employed.  Subjects performed comparably in 
both the single and dual task conditions, indicating little attention was required.  
In the control tasks, subjects exhibited generally poor performance, despite the 
introduction of a stronger, more redundant stimulus.  Surprisingly, subjects were 
able to detect the presence of an animal in more than one image when two were 
presented simultaneously.  One control condition showed performance similar to 
that in the scene categorization condition.  When subjects were discriminating 
upright letters, because the stimuli are meaningful and familiar, subjects were 
able to categorize accurately regardless of dual-task load.  The authors conclude 
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that meaningful objects with which subjects have had extensive experience may 
be processed outside of attention. 
 While in many studies of scene perception there is sufficient time for 
cognitive mechanisms that involve feedback driven hierarchical constraints, 
some still pose a major hurdle such an interactivist account.  Research by 
Thorpe and colleagues demonstrates that subjects are able to reliably identify 
common categories of objects and scenes and generate the appropriate motor 
response in as little as 150 ms (Thorpe, 2002).  In a series of studies observers 
were presented with photographs of animals for very short durations (~20ms) 
(Thorpe et al., 1996).  Subjects were to indicate whether the photographic scene 
contained an animal in a go/no-go paradigm.  Animals were drawn from a range 
of categories including mammals, fish, insects, and reptiles and presented at a 
range of scales.  Distractor stimuli included the same sorts of natural contexts in 
which the animals would appear, however, these scenes contained no visible 
animals.  Despite the brief exposure, subjects were quite accurate and 
responded rapidly.  The distribution of responses were sorted in order to find the 
minimum reaction time, or the time at which correct responses significantly 
outnumbered incorrect responses.  This minimum reaction time, including time to 
plan and execute a motor response, was 250 ms.  This rapid identification of 
critical objects was extended in a finding involving vehicle detection (VanRullen & 
Thorpe, 2001), demonstrating that this form of rapid scene processing is not 
restricted to natural categories.  Interestingly, familiarity does not seem to 
facilitate this type of object detection task (Fabre-Thorpe, et al., 2001).  After 
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training with a subset of images over 14 days, observers demonstrated similar 
reaction times for familiar or novel scenes in rapid scene categorization task.  
This rapid scene processing can occur rapidly and in parallel across multiple 
images despite differences in viewing conditions, structural contexts, scale, and 
other inter-image variables.  Observers can detect the presence of an animal in 
two scenes presented on either side of fixation as rapidly as a single scene and 
with comparable accuracy (Rousselet et al., 2002). 
 Because of the complications involved in plotting the time-course of these 
rapid scene classifications using only overt responses, convergent methods have 
been employed.  Electrophysiological investigations demonstrate differential 
activity in the frontal lobe for trials with animal-containing scenes in as little as 
120ms after stimulus onset (Thorpe et al., 1996).  Tracking eye fixations 
represents another sensitive and highly ecological measure of scene processing.  
Observers were presented with two scenes for 20 ms offset 6° on either side of 
fixation and instructed to saccade toward the scene that contained an animal 
(Kirchner & Thorpe, 2006).  The minimum saccadic reaction time, defined as the 
10ms time bin that contained reliably more correct than incorrect responses, was 
120ms.  Surprisingly, if one assumes 25 ms is required to plan a saccade, the 
presence of an animal can be reliable detected in one of two briefly presented 
scenes in approximately 100 ms. 
 These results are indicative of a response that was generated on a single 
feed forward pass (Fabre-Thorpe et al., 2001). It should be noted that this is not 
an argument about whether top-down feedback plays any role in scene 
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perception, but rather a demonstration that many complex perceptual tasks can 
be accomplished in a purely feed-forward manner.  This feed-forward position is 
supported by a variety of arguments.  First, recent evidence indicates that even 
cells relatively early in the visual system are highly selective (Karklin & Lewicki, 
2003).  The non-linear behavior of these early visual cells stands in contrast to 
traditional filterbank accounts of early visual processing (Hubel & Wiesel, 1962, 
1990).  Additionally, some ultra-rapid classification studies have demonstrated 
that responses are just as fast with black and white images (Delorme et al. 
2000).  The authors argue that this is consistent with accounts in which 
information from the achromatic magnocellular pathway reaches the visual cortex 
before the chromatic information present in the parvocellular pathway (Nowak & 
Bullier, 1997).  Additionally, neuroanatomically plausable feed-forward 
computational models have been able to perform a variety of scene processing 
tasks including face detection (Van Rullen et al., 1998) and animal detection 
(Serre et al., 2007). 
 The neuroanatomical constraints that drive this feed-forward argument are 
beginning to be well understood.  As shown in Figure 5, each successive 
processing stage has been characterized to some extent.    
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Figure 5.  A schematic temporal characterization of processing in a rapid scene 
classification task (Image reproduced from Thorpe, 2002) 
It should be noted that this temporal analysis does not assume that processing 
occurs serially or address whether these processes cascade between stages.  
These latencies represent the earliest reliable activity at a given stage of visual 
processing in response to a stimulus, not the termination or resolution of those 
processes.  Latencies between the retinal surface and the retinal ganglion 
typically run around 20 ms (Sestokas et al., 1987).  Schmolesky et al. (1998) 
measured firing latencies across the macaque visual system.  Their results are 
particularly useful because all timing observations were collected in a single lab 
and all the animals were prepared using similar methods.  The subjects were 
anesthetized and presented with synthetic stimuli while single cell recordings 
were collected.  Spike trains from the retina reach the lateral geniculate nucleus 
in around 30 ms, in the case of the magnocellular layers, and 50 ms, along the 
parvocellular pathway.  Information arrives at V1 between 50 and 70 ms following 
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stimulus onset, depending on the laminar layer.  Neural firing in response to a 
visually presented stimulus has been demonstrated in V4 in 60 to 80 ms after 
stimulus onset.  Following the elaborate processing that occurs in V4, object 
identification (e.g. animal) likely occurs in the inferotemporal cortex (Tanaka, 
2002).  Signals would require an additional 40 to 20 ms to reach this high-level 
visual recognition area.  Once a candidate object is identified, a decision, 
presumably involving prefrontal areas would be required.  Once a decision is 
made, pre-motor and motor areas must represent and execute the appropriate 
response with additional time required for transmission of the efferent motor 
signal to the spinal cord and then the hand.  Given the timing estimates 
described above, little time is left for feedback from a higher-processing stage to 
a lower one. 
 It should be noted that the sequence of stages described above does not 
include the possibility of subcortical processing.  Neuroanatomical studies 
indicate that older, direct connections, such as those from the thalamus to the 
amygdala, may provide coarse information without the elaboration that is 
believed to occur in the inferior temporal cortex (Fendrich et al., 2001).  It seems 
reasonable that certain types of affective stimulus processing could proceed 
without the elaboration enabled by the recruitment of higher, cortical visual areas.  
However, the range of classifications that can be rapidly performed in the 
previously described series of experiments (e.g. animals, vehicles, scene 
categories), are difficult to account for in terms of a entirely or mostly sub-cortical 
mechanism.   
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 In the studies conducted by Thorpe and colleagues, observers were 
presented with a single object detection task.  As mentioned, detection accuracy 
was quite high and response times were surprisingly low.  Fei-fei et al. (2005) 
conducted an investigation into this rapid scene categorization while subjects 
simultaneously performed an unrelated task.  Subjects were presented with 
sequences of letters centrally and were instructed to make same different 
categorizations.  In the dual-task condition, images were presented 
simultaneously at varying degrees of eccentricity.  Subjects were presented with 
scene categorization tasks consisting of facial gender, animal detection, and 
vehicle detection.  Several control tasks using synthetic stimuli were also 
employed.  Subjects performed comparably in both the single and dual task 
conditions, indicating little attention was required.  In the control tasks, subjects 
exhibited generally poor performance, despite the introduction of a stronger, 
more redundant stimulus.  Surprisingly, subjects were able to detect the 
presence of an animal in more than one image when two are simultaneously 
presented.  One control condition showed performance similar to that in the 
scene categorization condition.  When subjects were discriminating upright 
letters, because the stimuli are meaningful and familiar, subjects were able to 
categorize accurately regardless of dual-task load.  The authors conclude that 
meaningful objects with which subjects have had extensive experience may be 
processed outside of attention. 
 Taken together, these studies indicate that observers are able to rapidly, 
and efficiently, extract semantic information from scenes.  While the specific 
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mechanisms supporting this performance are uncertain, scene knowledge 
available so rapidly could be used to direct visual attention towards items 
relevant to the current goal of visual attention.   
 Attention to meaning.  We have reviewed the evidence that scene 
knowledge is available rapidly in scene viewing.  The following findings review 
evidence that the attentional mechanisms are sensitive to semantic properties of 
briefly presented visual stimuli.  In many of these cases, an attentional blink (AB), 
or deficit for targets appearing close in time, is the measure of attentional 
engagement.  A more detailed description of the AB follows this sampling of 
recent evidence for semantic, or conceptual, ACS. 
 Evidence for a general semantic AB following the capture of visual 
attention is presented by Maki & Mebane (2006).  Observers were presented with 
target words in a false font RSVP paradigm.  Participants reported target words 
presented in black in an RSVP stream at the end of each trial.  A variety of 
distractors sharing different levels of similarity to the target were embedded in the 
RSVP sequence.  In contrast to the false font stimuli, some trials contained 
critical distractors consisting of colored words or consonant strings that preceded 
target items at certain set lags.  Observers were less likely to accurately report 
target strings when they were preceded by these attention capturing distractors.  
Specifically, the semantic characteristics of the distractors drove the effects, with 
those stimuli that were most word-like resulting in the greatest costs.  These 
results demonstrate that searching for any meaningful item among mostly 
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meaningless distractors can result in an AB following a meaningful but visually 
distinct distractor. 
 Recent evidence suggests that an observer’s current emotional state 
influences attentional capture by critical distractors in an RSVP sequence (Most 
et al., 2010).  Heterosexual couples were placed in an experimental setting 
wherein female participants were led to believe that their partners were 
completing an attractiveness rating task involving either landscapes or women.  
While male participants completed these ratings tasks, female participants 
completed an RSVP task where they were to indicate whether or not a rotated 
landscape was presented on a given trial.  Critical distractors were selected from 
an affective image database and included negative, arousing images.  Those 
female observers who rated their unease with the attractiveness rating task 
demonstrated a larger AB for negative images.  These findings suggest that 
semantic picture processing is modulated by the observer’s emotional construal 
of the experimental context. 
 In another AB demonstration of semantic ACS, observers were presented 
with an RSVP task in which they were to selectively encode and report the 
identity of words on the basis of high-level semantic features (Barnard, Scott, 
Taylor, May, & Knightley, 2004).  Observers were presented with lists of 35 
words at 110 ms/item and instructed to recall only those words that referred to 
professions (e.g. baker).  Despite the arbitrary and rather abstract criteria used to 
define targets in the sequence, observers had little difficulty accurately reporting 
those words which belonged to the appropriate category. However, report 
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accuracy depended heavily on the semantic properties of a distractor word that 
preceded the target at various lags.  Most words in the sequence referred to 
natural objects and location (e.g. archipelago, cloud, thicket).  Critical distractors 
were presented in two conditions, each with a unique level of semantic 
relationship between the distracting word and the target-defining category.  
Distracting words with low levels of semantic relatedness to the target category 
included various common household objects (e.g. telephone, couch).  Distractors 
with high levels of semantic relatedness described human roles other than 
professions (e.g. father, tourist).  The temporal relationship between these 
distracting words and targets on a given trial was manipulated.  Observers were 
less likely to detect target words when they were preceded by distracting words 
of high semantic relatedness.  The costs associated with the detection of a 
related distractor were distributed in a manner similar to the classic AB effect 
(lag-1 sparing, gradual recovery of performance over the 500 ms).  This result is 
interesting because observers were not required to make any overt response to 
the related distractors.  
 It would appear as though the types of semantic features used to 
selectively encode and retrieve items compatible with current ACS are rather 
coarse and do not have detailed denotative meanings.  The magnitude of the 
blink effect associated with a particular type of distractor was predicted by 
measures of semantic related using latent semantic analysis (LSA) (Dumais, 
2004; Landauer, Foltz, Laham, 1997).  LSA uses measures of the co-occurrence 
of words in large corpora of text to quantify their contextual-usage meaning. 
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There are four steps to an LSA treatment of corpora.  First a “bag of words” 
representation is generated describing the frequency for each word in some 
larger unit of words (sentences, paragraphs, etc.).  In the second step, this table 
is then transformed to normalize the frequencies relative to upweight infrequently 
occurring words and downweight frequently occurring words.  Next, these 
normalized frequency tables are then decomposed into an arbitrary number of 
semantic dimensions that describe the frequencies in terms of an arbitrarily 
defined number of hidden dimensions.  Researchers are able to specify the 
number of dimensions used to describe the distribution of words.  Increasing the 
number of dimension improves the fidelity of the quantitative semantic 
description of the target word.  At the same time that more dimensions results in 
higher accuracy, diminishing returns result from the use of too many factors.  
Lastly, the similarity between each word and all other words is calculated in this 
new reduced multidimensional space.  Similarity between vectors containing 
values along each of the inferred dimensions is quantified by the cosine of the 
two vectors (essentially a measure of the angular similarity between the two 
vectors in this high dimensional semantic space). 
 The results of Barnard and colleagues (2004) have been successfully 
described using a computational model.  Barnard & Bowman (2003) argue that 
two semantic memory systems, an implicational system and propositional 
system, support regular semantic processing of stimuli.  The implicational system 
represents what the authors refer to as “generic level” meaning, including 
connotation and category relations.  This implicational system is capable of 
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rapidly extracting general semantic information and assessing the salience of the 
information in the context of the ongoing task.  The salience of a given distractor 
in the current task is determined by both transient and enduring attentional 
dispositions.  For example, emotionally charged or personal items might pass the 
implicational test despite being quite independent of current overt  behavioral 
goals.  The implicational system takes “the immediate products of visual, 
auditory, and body-state patterns.”  This information is considered unrefined and 
relatively direct.   
 Ariga & Yokosawa (2008) present additional evidence of selective 
processing of objects on the basis of abstract, non-visual ACS in an RSVP 
experiment using something like a modified Stroop involving kanji.  Subjects 
were instructed to report the identity of a uniquely colored target in that 
sequence.  An attentional blink, or temporary performance deficit following a 
critical distractor, was observed when a target character was preceded by a 
distractor whose meaning matched the target color.  That is, if observers were 
looking for a character that appeared in blue, they would be more likely to miss 
this character following a character that means blue. This attentional capture 
effect indicates that the ACS employed by the observers were abstract enough 
that capture obtains for stimuli that share only semantic properties with the 
target.  This is not to say that ACS have no detailed visual character.  Rather, 
there is a not insignificant semantic component that can influence performance in 
tasks that do not require semantic processing of stimuli. 
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 Koivisto & Revonsuo (2007) extend these findings, presenting evidence 
that task-driven semantic ACS can influence the likelihood of detection in 
inattentional blindness tasks.  Observers were instructed to rapidly encode and 
remember a collection of 4 simultaneously presented words or line drawings. 
After completing several expected trials, on a critical trial observers were 
presented with an unexpected word (in the picture condition) or picture (in the 
word condition) at fixation. As expected, inattentional blindness was observed for 
unexpected words or objects.  Importantly, this inattentional blindness interacted 
with the semantic properties of the unexpected stimulus, such that when the 
word or image matched the semantic category of the stimulus in the primary task 
(either animals or furniture), inattentional blindness was less likely. 
 In a study evaluating the role of long-term object representations in a 
visual search task, observers were presented greyscale photographic images by 
Olivers (2010) and instructed to locate a traffic sign with an associated color (e.g. 
stop sign).  Despite the fact that the target was always a greyscale image, 
observers were slower to locate and respond to the target on trials where there 
was a red distractor.  Olivers concludes that attentive behavior is guided by 
information stored in long-term memory representations and that the use of these 
representations is automatic.  That is, observers could not exclude color 
knowledge regarding the stop sign from the attentional filter they employed 
despite the face that this harmed their performance in the task. 
 Moores, Laiti, & Chelazzi (2003) present compelling evidence that visual 
attention is sensitive to the associative relationships between objects when 
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observers are conducting visual searches.  Observers completed a visual search 
task containing photographs of common objects.  Search displays were 
presented very briefly followed by a patterned mask.  Participants searched the 
displays for a verbally labeled target object.  Critically, on some trials these target 
objects appeared along with an associated item.  These associations were varied 
including tool-object (hammer-nail), resource-product (cow-milk) and conceptual 
relationships (statue of liberty-american flag). Free recall and recency judgments 
regarding distractors demonstrated that objects associated with a search target 
are preferentially processed.  These direct measures of distractor processing 
may have given participants an incentive to attend to items other than the target.  
In Experiment 4, observers simply completed the primary task of determining 
whether a target object was present in the display.  Here observers had no 
reason to attend to items other than the target.  Here the presence of associated 
distractors reduced accuracy and increased latency, but only on target absent 
trials.  It appears as though associates were transiently treated as targets, 
resulting in higher false alarms (18% vs. 10%) and slower responses on target 
absent trials.  The authors argue this is due to the strong advantage for target 
objects in the competition of the target with its associates.  Also of interest is the 
lack of a spatial attentional effect in Experiment 3.  In this experiment, there was 
a red dot probe that appeared on one of the objects in the visual search array 
after some random interval.  On target absent trials, this red dot could appear on 
either associatively related or unrelated objects.  Subjects were no faster to 
respond to the onset of the dot when it appeared on the related objects.  This is 
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consistent with selection of associated objects occurring at a later, non-spatial 
stage of perceptual processing. 
 
Figure 6.  Examples of the associative pairs employed in Moores, Laiti, & 
Chelazzi (2003) (Fig 2, p.184) 
 While the results of these experiments are provocative and have clear 
consequences for the current set of experiments, there are three key issues that 
undermine this demonstration of associative attention.  First, observers were 
completing a detection task.  The use of a detection task has two consequences.  
Because observers completed the coarsest of perceptual determinations, 
detection, the experiment provides little information about the specific type of 
information the observers used to complete the task.  Observers could be 
identifying the target based on detailed or coarse object knowledge.  In a related 
result of the design, the ACS required for observers to detect an item that may or 
may not be present is in many ways unlike the attentional set required to 
selectively encode a target.  In some circumstances observers are searching for 
an object and must both identify the object and perform some perceptual 
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operation on the object.  For example, an observer might be required to answer a 
question about an object’s pose or color.  It is not clear what influence depictions 
of associated concepts will have in these circumstances.  Second, observers 
were encouraged to respond quickly as response time was a dependent 
measure.  Theories of attentional control are more precisely tested under 
unspeeded conditions (Leber, 2004; Norman & Bobrow, 1975).  If selective 
mechanisms are to be strained in isolation from post-selection operations, it is 
important to use accuracy as a dependent measure in an unspeeded 
discrimination.  For example, if a speeded discrimination is made, observers‘ 
performance may reflect response conflict (Gratton et al., 1988).  While these 
post-perceptual effects are important, measuring them together with perceptual 
effects can make it difficult to evaluate claims carefully.  Third, because the target 
and the associated distractor shared a common onset, little can be said about the 
timecourse of object-associate interference.  For example, Auckland et al. (2007) 
found no effect of associated items when they shared a common onset with the 
target in an unspeeded forced-choice discrimination.  Unlike the work by 
Auckland and colleagues, participants in these experiments had a particular 
target in mind.  The effects of context could be quite fast acting, given that the 
participant already has  a target in mind, but this is unclear in this design.  Each 
of these three methodological concerns is addressed in the present experiments 
using a design sensitive enough to detect contextual costs on target-present 
trials.  
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 These studies demonstrate the specific types of flexibility we described as 
necessary if observers were to selectively attend to associated contexts when 
searching for a categorical target.  Observers attend to both target objects and 
information associated with a target object.  This means that ACS are controlled 
by a mechanism that reflects the redundant structure of perceptual events.  
Further, these associative structures are selectively deployed on a trial by trial 
basis, such that observers preferentially attend to items relevant to the current 
trial primarily.  The following section will formulate the motivating theory for these 
experiments more explicitly.   
 Attentional capture and control.  In order to evaluate theories regarding 
the selection criteria utilized by attentional mechanisms, and the degree to which 
observers can choose these criteria, one requires a paradigm that can sensitively 
measure these systems.  One particularly well replicated failure of temporal 
visual attention involves difficulty detecting targets presented in rapid succession.  
The current experiments use an attentional blink as the measure of attentional 
capture by the related context.  The attentional blink, or a temporary inability to 
process targets presented in rapid succession, was first demonstrated by 
Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell (1992).  Observers were presented with an RSVP 
sequence of containing target letters and distractors.  Observers were instructed 
to detect and identify multiple targets presented with various onset asynchronies.  
Observers were less likely to detect subsequent targets following a detected prior 
target.  The costs associated with the encoding of an initial target begins 
approximately 100 ms after target offset and persist for another 400 ms. This 
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decreased likelihood of detection is known as the attentional blink (AB).  
Critically, targets that are presented immediately following the initial target show 
no costs.  This effect, known as lag-1 sparing, has been central in various 
accounts of these costs. 
 Raymond and colleagues initially argued that the attentional blink was due 
to inhibitory mechanisms that exclude irrelevant information while the initial target 
is being processed.  The elaboration of a visual representation within VSTM may 
be vulnerable during the first few moments of encoding.  By shielding these 
elaborative processes from competing visual information, the first target is made 
available for report but later targets are missed.  According to this protective 
account of the AB, the degree of inhibition should vary as a function of the 
difficulty of perceptual processing required to individuate and identify the first 
target.  On trials where the first target was easy to process, little or no attentional 
blink should be observed because the processing of the first target would be 
interfered with by successive targets to a minimal extent.  Contrastingly, on trials 
requiring sophisticated processing of the first target, observers will be more likely 
to miss successive targets.  Lag-1 sparing occurs because two targets presented 
in immediate succession are both represented in VSTM simultaneously, because 
they map to similar responses they interfere with one another minimally. 
 This early selection account of the AB was falsified when Shapiro, 
Raymond, & Arnell (1994) presented observers with RSVP sequences containing 
targets that were either perceptually hard or easy (as assessed via a separate 
series of experiments) and observed a consistent AB effect.  Instead, the authors 
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proposed a late selection account wherein both the initial and subsequent targets 
are processed to an extent where they are both identified as targets, but these 
temporary representations of the target category interfere in VSTM.  This 
interference leaves only one of the two tokens available for report.  A relatively 
late bottleneck has received significant empirical support.  For example, Luck, 
Vogel, & Shapiro (1996) presented observers with RSVP sequences of words.  
The semantic relationships between words in the sequence was manipulated 
while electroencephalographic measures were gathered.  The researchers 
monitored for an N400 pattern of activity which associated with violations of 
semantic expectancy.  On some trials, observers were presented with words that 
violated semantic expectations.  On other trials, words were appropriate for the 
context.  Despite the fact that observers failed to report the target words when 
presented during the blink, the magnitude of the N400 wave remained relatively 
constant across numerous lag settings.  This is consistent with observers 
processing the meaning of the stimulus, but failing to construct a representation 
that was available for free report. 
 Chun and Potter (1995) present a two-stage account of the attentional 
blink where the consolidation of a first stage representation prevents the 
consolidation of a successively presented competing target.  When observers 
initially view a target in an RSVP sequence, the authors suggest that this triggers 
a volatile conceptual representation of the target object.  This conceptual 
representation os hypothesized to include the target identity, it’s membership in 
the target category, and similar semantic information.  Before this initial 
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representation is available for report, the observer must consolidate this 
representation into a more durable form.  This process takes some period of 
time.  If the duration of this consolidation process extends beyond the point 
where a high quality representation of the second target is still available in the 
first stage, observers will be less likely to report the second target.  Lag 1 sparing 
occurs because of temporal imprecision in the gating mechanism to the 
consolidation process.   If the second target follows closely enough upon the 
heels of the first, then both targets are sent into the consolidation mechanism 
and both are successively tokenized. 
 In order for observers to be able to report the presence of a target in a 
sequence of rapidly presented items, they must construct of a representation of 
the target category or type that is associated with this particular context.  The 
process of generating this context specific and temporary representation of the 
target class is known as tokenization.    Failures of tokenization are well 
characterized within the repetition blindness (RB) literature.  Repetition blindness 
involves the failure to detect repeated target stimuli when presented in rapid 
temporal succession (Kanwisher, 1987).    It is rather similar to the AB and the 
psychological refractory period (PRP).  In each of these cases, stimuli presented 
in rapid succession suffers when temporal limits of human perceptual, cognitive, 
and motor capabilities are exceeded.  The rapid post-categorical memory system 
that seems to be responsible for RB is hypothesized to maintain an innate bias 
against creating multiple tokens of a single object.  When objects are presented 
in rapid succession, this conservative mechanism either fails to individuate a 
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second token or merges the first token with the second.  RB is unlike the AB in 
the following ways.  First, subjects are typically instructed to freely recall the 
presented objects in RB studies (but see Kanwisher, Kim, & Wickens, 1996) 
whereas AB studies typically involve detection measures.  Second, RB can occur 
when items are presented simultaneously, or in rapid succession (Kanwisher & 
Potter, 1990).  In AB studies, the relative timing of the initial and subsequent 
targets is critical, as demonstrated by the lag 1 sparing phenomenon.  A variety 
of other factors, including the discriminability of targets compared with 
distractors, the episodic distinctiveness of the individual targets, and the similarity 
between successively presented targets has been shown to influence AB and RB 
differently.  While the attentional blink is clearly a different phenomenon the two 
may both result from failures of token individuation. 
 Both the Chun and Potter two stage model (1995) and the late-selection 
interference based account presented by Raymond and colleagues share 
hypotheses about the presence of a capacity limited stage where transient but 
reasonably elaborated stimuli compete for scarce resources.  In the case of the 
interference based account, tokens compete in VSTM in a manner that is biased 
toward the first target that began the consolidation process.  In the two stage 
model, representations in CSTM fail to be adequately tokenized because 
consolidation processes are preoccupied.   
 DiLollo, Kawahar, & Ghorashi (2006) and Olivers (2009) present accounts 
wherein the control of visual attention is central to understanding the attentional 
blink.  Within both accounts, a guiding target representation is rapidly compared 
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with the successively presented visual stimuli.  This representation is maintained 
within a relatively active attentional control system that is rapidly conducting 
sequential comparisons.  These two theories diverge, however, in terms of how 
they address the AB from here. 
 DiLollo et al. (2006) argue that once a stimulus is encountered that 
matches, the attentional control processes that govern the maintenance of the 
target template cease with the presentation of the first target.  In the absence of 
these signals, observers are able to identify an immediately following target 
because no other images, be they attended or not, have been presented.  As 
soon as intervening distractor is encountered subsequent utilization of this 
attenuated target template is disrupted.  The temporary loss of control model 
advanced by DiLollo and colleagues has been criticized for allowing the influence 
of capacity limitations similar to the Raymond and Potter models (Olivers, 2009).  
In this case, the capacity limitations are associated with the attentional control 
system and not the processes used to consolidate fleeting representations. 
 Olivers (2009) presents a novel computational model of the attentional 
blink that does not make reference to any capacity limited consolidation process.  
In this account, items are initially processed in a perceptual memory system 
where both low- and high-level information about the target is available.  The 
gating mechanism that permits items to enter working memory is governed by an 
attentional control mechanism that maintains an attentional set for the target 
item.  Critically, there is some temporal lag in the gating mechanism such that 
activation or inhibition of a matching item occurs approximately 100 ms after the 
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item is compared with the attentional template.  When observers are presented 
with an initial target, this is quickly followed by an activation signal that boosts the 
perceptual processing of the next item.  On trials where the initial target is 
followed by a second target, the second target is successfully consolidated.  On 
trials where the target is followed by a distractors, this gating mechanism detects 
a strong mismatch (strong because of the activating signal generated in the 
presence of the first target).  This strong mismatch results in an inhibitory signal 
being sent to the perceptual processing stage.  On trials with target-distractor-
target sequences, this inhibition falls on the second target. 
 Given the similarity of these various accounts it can be difficult to design 
experiments to arbitrate among them.  However, all these accounts give a key 
role to the ACS that a subject is maintaining as they monitor the sequence of 
images.  Regardless of the particular mechanics of the AB, in all cases the failure 
to identify subsequent targets occurs because multiple targets satisfy the target-
defining criteria.  This will be important when we consider the capture effects in 
the present experiments.  
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Chapter 3: Theory and General Methods 
Attentional Capture in Object Search by Associated Contexts 
 Motivating theory.   In our everyday lives we regularly visually explore 
our environment for objects based on incomplete information.  We might be 
looking for the remote control, a set of car keys, or a missing pet.  In cases where 
the object is familiar to us, this task is simplified somewhat as we have a general 
sense of the visual properties of our target.  In the case of less familiar objects, 
our ability to quickly identify or locate specific categories of objects is harder to 
understand.  One strategy that might be used to locate a known object category 
involves biasing attention towards associated contextual information.  Observers 
can use knowledge about contexts where the target object is typically 
encountered as an additional cue to locate this categorically defined object. 
 The research literature reviewed is clear that: 1) object-context 
associations play a key role in object and scene processing, 2) scene schema 
and other high level scene properties are available quickly, 3) ACS mechanisms 
are informed by knowledge about objects, and 4) observers can establish ACS 
that match the current task at relatively abstract level.  Given these facts, it is 
reasonable to hypothesize that associations between an object and scene can 
structure attentive behavior to support the localization and identification of task 
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relevant objects. The selection of a target object in a scene, particularly when the 
visual details of the target are uncertain, is not a computationally trivial task.  If 
attentional mechanisms could be leveraged to isolate just those objects and 
features relevant to the object search, this would reduce the demands on the 
observer.   
 As reviewed previously, the influence of depicted context on the 
recognition of a target item is powerful (Palmer, 1975; Hollingworth & Henderson, 
1999; Auckland, Cave, Donnelly, 2007).  This influence obtains as differences in 
sensitivity and bias.  The current experiments describe a contextual influence 
fundamentally unlike previous demonstrations.  Typically, observers are 
presented with a target item and then must indicate retrospectively what the 
target or targets were.  Observers are not looking for a particular object known in 
advance.  The detection or identification of a prespecified target has been shown 
to be much easier than the recollection of unspecified items in a list (Potter, 
1975).  If observers show the influence of contextual scenes when asked to 
recognize a category of target specified on a particular trial, this will be a novel 
demonstration of contextual influence and will speak to issues involved in object 
recognition and context more generally. 
  In the present experiments, object-context associations are hypothesized 
to structure object search in the following manner.  When observers wish to find 
a target object, anticipatory representations inform their overt and covert visual 
exploration of the environment.   Once a set of ACS are active, currently viewed 
stimuli are compared with these guiding representations.  The guiding influence 
 95!
of contextual associations have been demonstrated in visual search paradigms 
that manipulate observers’ familiarity with configurations of search arrays.  In 
contextual cueing, observers are able to quickly locate targets in repeated 
displays because the configuration of the display acts as an attentional cue that 
can guide attention towards a target item (Chun & Jiang, 1998; but see Kunar et 
al., 2007).  Learned contextual associations can result in costs if they invalidly 
cue the target location (Manginelli & Pollman, 2009; Fiske & Sanocki, 2010).  It 
seems reasonable to predict something analogous would happen on the basis of 
pre-experimental object-context covariation.   These experiments advance the 
discussion because here scene context is treated at a more abstract level (e.g. 
there is no licensed spatial relationship between the scene and target).  Or stated 
another way, the influence of scene knowledge is measured primarily in terms of 
conceptual scene knowledge rather than spatial scene knowledge.  Context in 
this case is treated as a relatively abstracted scene schema, rather than a 
particular configuration of searched items.    
 Observers searching for objects maintain a diffuse attentional set, with 
ACS informed by both target identifying and context identifying features.  These 
attentional parameters may be especially broad when observers are searching 
for an object on the basis of a categorical description.  The contextual 
representation employed in these ACS is a schematized description of the scene 
context where an object is typically encountered.  When observers are presented 
with visual information that matches this contextual representation, scarce 
perceptual resources are allocated on the basis of this match.  In typical scene 
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viewing, this is adaptive because, to the extent that object-scene associations 
represent the co-occurrence of scene features veridically, perceptual complexity 
can be reduced by the exclusion of irrelevant regions and enhancement of 
relevant regions. 
 Testing attentional capture.  Researchers have spent a great deal of 
time considering what criteria need to be met for a stimulus to be said to truly 
capture visual attention (Logan, 1992).  Only when there is no incentive in an 
experiment for attending to a stimulus can it truly be said to capture attention 
(Theeuwes, Kramer, Hahn, Irwin, & Zelinsky, 1999).  As implied by the use of the 
term “capture”, we seek to measure the direction of the observer’s perceptual 
resources towards some object in violation of the observer’s will.  Typically, this 
is done by manipulating the salience of a distractor in some perceptually 
demanding task.  For example, observers might search for a color target in the 
presence of an irrelevant onset or the reverse (Theeuwes, 1994).  If observers 
attend to these salient distractors, despite the lack of an incentive to do so, the 
distractor can be said to capture attention and will result in performance costs ins 
the primary task.  In the following experiments the task relevance of a distractor 
will be manipulated.   
 In order to put this theory to a strong test, contextual information and 
object recognition information will be manipulated independently and set in 
competition with each other.  In this way we can measure the involuntary 
processing of contextual information while the participant is engaged in an object 
search task.  Similar logic supports attentional interference paradigms such as 
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stroop (MacLeod, 1991) and flanker (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1994) tasks.  In these 
cases there are competing information sources presented simultaneously in a 
common region of space.  When distractor information bears certain relationships 
with the target, this interferes with processing in the primary task.  Rather than 
the automatic and over-learned processing of irrelevant letter or word information 
in a letter or color identification task, the following experiments measure the 
obligatory processing of contextual information in an object search task.  
However, unlike typical instances of either of these interference tasks, the costs 
of this automatic processing in the following experiments will be measured in 
accuracy rather than response time for reasons described earlier.  The way in 
which the objects and contexts are sequenced in these experiments is artificial 
but necessary to test determine whether participants must attend to the 
contextual image.   
 In the following experiments, observers will be presented with a series of 
object recognition tasks where no useful information is contained in a contextual 
image distractor on any trial.  Despite this, the contextual images will capture 
attention because of relationships with the target item on a particular trial.  This 
demonstration of attentional capture is contingently automatic in much the the 
same way as the demonstrations by Folk, Remington, & Johnston (1992).  In 
these experiments, observers were presented with a cued visual search task.  
Targets appeared randomly at one of four locations.  These targets were 
preceded by valid or invalid spatial cues.  When the cues contained the target 
defining feature, they captured attention even when this impaired observers’ 
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performance.  When cues did not contain the target defining feature, observers 
were able to effectively ignore the cues.   Observers were able to select a given 
attentional set, say for the color “red”, but could not control the way in which this 
attentional set was implemented during selective processing.  The observers 
could choose to selectively attend to red targets but could not ignore the red 
spatial cues that preceded the target containing display despite the fact that the 
form of the cues was visually distinct from that of the targets.  In the following 
experiments, observers maintained an attentional set for a target object category.  
If this attentional set contains information about associated contexts, observers 
will be forced to attend these contexts even when it harms their performance in 
the object search task.  In order to test this claim, it will be important to present 
the object and context in competition with each other.   
 Testing capture by associated context.  These experiments test the 
claim that when observers search their environment for common objects, they do 
so with ACS that include information about schematized spatial contexts where 
objects are typically encountered.  Perceptual processing of these associated 
contexts will be facilitated because the ACS bias processing towards not only 
target objects but also these associated contexts.  Testing this prediction is 
difficult for several reasons.  First, as indicated by Moores et al. (2004), targets 
are generally strong competitors with their associates.  Designing an experiment 
powerful enough to detect an effect of associated distractor processing on target 
present trials is quite difficult (which is why RT measures are typically employed).  
In the current experiments, rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) was used to 
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place targets and contexts in competition.  Second, presenting observers with 
mixtures of target present and target absent trials can introduce complexities 
when interpreting data for reasons described earlier.   The following experiments 
include both detection and discrimination designs, showing costs attributable to 
associated contexts in these two related perceptual tasks.  Third, observers are 
sensitive to demand characteristics in studies such as this.  If one claims that 
observers are involuntarily engaged by and process associated contextual 
information, it is important to structure the design so that doing so affords no 
advantage in the primary object search task.  In these experiments, no contextual 
image contains the target object.  Moreover, the contextual images are visually 
distinct from our targets.  Fourth, selecting stimuli to test such a prediction is 
complicated on several levels.  A broad sample of associated objects and scenes 
must be gathered.  For each pair, multiple photographs of prototypical category 
members in a discriminable pose and scale must be collected.  More subtly, 
appropriate control stimuli must be selected.  Previous research in object 
recognition and contextual associations was compromised through inappropriate 
use of control stimuli (Biederman, 1981, Hollingworth & Henderson, 1998).  In the 
following studies care was taken in stimulus selection.  A broad range of object 
categories (69 or 71) were employed, ensuring the generality of the effect.  A 
large number of the object-context pairs were selected from word association 
norms (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 2004), and all pairs were independently 
rated by two observers with the lowest rated associations excluded.  While each 
object category was encountered multiple times in all experiments, in most of the 
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following experiments an object image served as a target or lure only once.  This 
prevented observers from using strategies based on low-level image properties.  
More importantly, a variable mapping design was employed such that the target 
and distractor on a given trial were chosen from the same pool of images.  This 
ensured that target and distractor images did not differ in image statistics or 
novelty.  The following experiments address each of these four concerns 
effectively. 
General Methods 
 Presentation method.  Because object recognition is an enduring 
research domain, a wide variety of experimental paradigms are available.  In the 
current series of experiments, RSVP was chosen as a display method for several 
reasons.  First, because we wished to know whether observers’ attention is 
captured by associated contexts, observers had to be engaged in a task where 
selective attention is required to perform well (Leber, 2004).   Observers who do 
not attend to a particular item in an RSVP sequence show poor memory for that 
item, ensuring a sensitive measure of observers’ attention (Potter, 1976).  
Second, human object recognition performance is generally high, so images 
must be degraded to pull performance away from ceiling.  In RSVP, images are 
masked, both by preceding and following images, across numerous dimensions.  
This makes the task challenging enough that manipulations have a chance to 
actually influence performance.  Third, RSVP allows precise control over stimulus 
order, duration, and retinal position.  To evaluate what sorts of images capture 
attention when an observer is searching for an object, a method must control, to 
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the extent that it is possible, observer gaze.  RSVP stimuli are presented at or 
near fixation so performance is not limited by peripheral acuity.  Further, because 
the stimuli are presented for brief intervals, there is no time for observers to make 
eye movements.  While some subjects may make inadvertent eye-movements 
during the approximately one second trial, these deviations are cancelled out by 
averaging across trials and subjects.  While clearly artificial in many respects, 
RSVP approximates natural scene viewing in others.  The anisotropic distribution 
of photoreceptors along the retina surface, among other factors, forces observers 
to serialize their samples of visual information.  In typical scene viewing, these 
fixations last only several hundred milliseconds before retinal input is suppressed 
and saccades are initiated towards another location.  RSVP was initially 
designed to approximate the rapidly changing retinal input that accompanies the 
visual exploration of a scene (Potter & Levy, 1969).  The selection mechanisms 
involved in sampling task relevant information at fixation from an RSVP stream 
may well be the same mechanisms that select saccadic targets and fixation 
duration during free scene viewing.  Lastly, presenting the objects in isolation 
against a high contrast background ensures that the object outline is visible.  The 
external outline of an object is particularly important in object recognition 
(Hayward & Tarr, 1997) providing information about part boundaries that can be 
used to identify objects (Hoffman, 1984; but see Sanocki, Bowyer, Heath, & 
Sarkar, 1998).  
 Stimulus selection.  In the following five experiments, observers were 
presented with images sampled from a collection of associated object and 
 102!
context photographs.  Many of these object-context image pairs were generated 
using word association norms (Nelson, McEvoy & Schreiber, 2004).  Candidate 
object-context associations were generated by choosing only those associations 
in the database with nouns as both cues and targets (e.g. boat-paddle).  Only 
items with both forward and backward cue-to-target strength of at least .10 were 
chosen.  Because these are free association norms, a forward cue-to-target 
strength of .10 indicates that 10% of subjects will report the target as the first 
word that comes to mind when asked to freely associate some word in memory 
with the target.  Backwards strength indicates the likelihood a given cue word will 
be generated when the target is instead presented a cue (e.g. paddle-boat).  
These normed stimulus pairs were then supplemented with additional items as is 
common (e.g. Most & Junge, 2008).   
 There were several considerations that went into the selection of object-
context pairs.  First, in no cases were targets to be categories of humans (e.g. 
firemen) because observers demonstrate specialized capabilities for detecting 
the human form and face in photographs.  This makes the interpretation of 
human detection performance problematic (see Mack & Palmeri, 2010 for a 
recent discussion).  It should be noted here that many of the contextual 
distractors did contain photographs of humans.  Because the variable mapping 
design of the study ensures that both associated and unassociated contextual 
distractors will contain human forms, differences in performance as a function of 
distractor relatedness will not be attributable to human images in the distractors.  
Secondly, target objects were chosen to represent a varied set of familiar object 
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categories.  As can be seen in Table 1, the range of categories employed is quite 
broad.  In order to ensure the generality of any findings, care was taken to 
include objects across a range of spatial scales and animacy categories.  
Appendix 1 contains all the pairs along with the associated images.  Despite this 
category variability, within each category objects were selected that were typical 
tokens.  This served two purposes.  It ensured that subjects will likely be able to 
use previous encounters with the target category to establish a search template 
(Vickery, King, & Jiang, 2005; Bravo & Farid, 2009).  If observers are to detect 
these objects on the basis of verbal label only, these objects need to have 
existing long-term memory representations that can inform ACS.  More 
importantly, using familiar objects increases both the likelihood that the object will 
have associations and the likelihood that these associations will be shared 
across individuals.  Once non-human, familiar target items were selected, the 
pool of possible associations was still further refined by selecting only those 
items for which multiple distinct, yet visually similar, photographs could be found.  
Images were sampled from a variety of internet sources (e.g. stock photography, 
google image search, etc.).  Once all these conditions were met, the collection of 
associated images contained 71 object-context pairs, each with 4 target and 4 
context photographs containing unique tokens, for a total of 568 images.   Figure 
7 shows some of the photographs used as target stimuli and their associated 
contexts.   
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Figure 7.  Examples of the object-context photograph pairs used in the object 
recognition task 
 A comparison of the target and contextual images will reveals several 
important stimulus properties.  The size of the target items are approximately 
equivalent, ensuring that observers cannot use the size of a briefly presented 
item to guess its identity.  Presenting comparably sized objects also increases 
the amount of masking by increasing the number of overlapping contours 
between successively presented stimuli.  Secondly, most contextual images are 
larger than the target items.  This ensures that subjects can identify the 
contextual image as something other than a target.  We want our observers to 
have both the ability and inclination to ignore the scenes to test whether they 
involuntarily orient towards them. 
 In the following experiments, if the contextual image on a trial was 
originally paired with the target object on that trial, it will be referred to as a 
related associated or related contextual distractor.  Similarly, if the contextual 
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image on a trial was originally paired with a different target object, it will be 
referred to as an unassociated or unrelated contextual distractor. 
Predictions for the Current Experiments 
 In the present experiments, the hypothesized attentional capture account 
is as follows.  When observers are instructed to monitor a rapidly changing 
sequence of photographic objects to identify and possibly encode a verbally 
labeled target object, they do so on the basis of diffuse ACS that includes 
conceptual knowledge about places where the target object was encountered 
previously.  When they are presented with an image that matches a currently 
active contextual representation, this distractor competes more successfully with 
the target than a contextual representation that is not currently active.  This line 
of reasoning leads to the counterintuitive prediction that performance will suffer 
on trials where associated contexts precede target objects.  This prediction is 
interesting because associated contexts are typically demonstrated to facilitate 
object recognition (Davenport & Potter, 2004; Auckland, Cave, & Donnelly, 
2007).  However, as mentioned previously, the facilitative effect of context in 
these experiments takes place when the target is unknown and must be 
recollected or identified after viewing. 
 In Experiment 1, observers were instructed to detect a verbally labelled 
target object presented within a rapidly presented sequence of images.  It has 
been demonstrated that detection deficits for rapidly presented stimuli depend on 
the relationship between distractors (here a contextual image) and the attentional 
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criteria used to identify targets (Leber & Egeth, 2006).  In this case, the 
association between a target object and its preceding context was expected to 
modulate the likelihood that observers will detect the target object.  As predicted, 
observers were less sensitive to target objects when those target objects 
followed associated contextual images. Later experiments replicate and extend 
this cost for discrimination. 
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Chapter 4: Contextual Capture and Detection 
Experiment 1 
Observers detected a verbally indicated target object category in a sequence of 
12 rapidly presented photographs.   
 Method 
 Participants.  34 (22 female) undergraduate students voluntarily 
participated in this experiment for extra-credit in undergraduate psychology 
classes.  All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision. 
 Stimuli.  Photographs of common objects and scenes, as described in 
Chapter 3 and listed in Appendix 1, were presented on an LCD monitor in dim 
light at a distance of approximately 50 cm.  Objects varied in size and area.  The 
average size of an object photograph was 11.65° (SD = 4.53) across by 10.61° 
(SD = 6.12) high.  Scene photographs averaged 24.43° (SD = 2.17) horizontally 
by 19.38° (SD = 3.79) vertically.  For each of 69 object categories, there were 4 
token images and 4 associated scene images, yielding a total of 552 images 
used in the experiment.  The sampling of these images is addressed in the 
design section below. 
 Procedure.  Each subject completed 276 self-paced, test trials.  As shown 
in Figure 8, each trial began with the press of the space bar after which 
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observers were presented with a one or two word verbal label for 500 ms 
indicating the category of object they were to detect in the image sequence.  
Immediately following the presentation of the target object category label, a 12 
image sequence was presented at 80 ms/item.  
  
Figure 8. Shows the trial sequence in Experiment 1.  Observers indicated 
whether cued object category was present in the sequence. 
 After the sequence of images was presented, observers were presented 
with a blank screen for 1000ms.  Following this unfilled period, observers were 
prompted to indicate whether or not they perceived the target object.  If 
observers believed the target item was presented in the sequence they pressed 
“1”.  If they believed the target item was not presented in the sequence they 
pressed “2”.  The entire experiment took an average of 20 minutes. 
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 Design.  Target-context relationship (associated, unassociated), target 
presence (absent, present), and target-context relative serial position (lag 1, lag 
3, and lag 5) were manipulated.   Observers searched for each of 69 object 
categories four times .  On half of trials the verbally cued target was present.  Out 
of those trials where a target was present, it was presented once following an 
associated context and once following an unassociated context.  On each trial, if 
the target object was present it was represented by a photograph that was 
chosen randomly without replacement from the 4 possible category token 
images.  Since each target image was used as a target only once, participants 
could not rely on strategies focusing on local features.  Similarly, on all trials 
contextual images were sampled without replacement from a pool of images.  In 
other words, no contextual image was used in more than one trial across the 
entire experiment.  As mentioned previously, a variable mapping design was 
employed with the same collection of photographs serving as target and 
distractors.   While each target image was only used as a target once, the entire 
collection of target images was used as a pool of distractor objects.  Images did 
repeat an average of four times across the experiment as distractors, but only 
appeared as targets once. 
 The relative serial position of the context image and the verbally cued 
target item was set to one of three possible lags.  In all of the following 
experiments, lag refers to the temporal relationship between the sequentially 
presented stimuli.  The lag level of a target present trial describes the relative 
serial positions of the contextual image and target.  For example, lag 1 trials 
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involve the target object presented immediately following the contextual image, 
whereas lag 3 trials entailed the presentation of two intervening distractors 
between the context image and the target.  Targets were positioned randomly in 
serial positions 6 through 10.  Contextual images preceded these targets by 1, 3, 
or 5 positions, meaning contextual images appeared at serial positions 1 through 
9.  Contextual distractors always preceded target objects.  Critically, the 
preceding contextual image could either be associated or unassociated with the 
target category.  On trials where the target object was associated with the 
contextual image, it was expected sustained top-down attentional engagement 
with the distracting contextual image will decrease sensitivity for targets following 
soon after this distractor.  The target-context relationship (associated, 
unassociated) and target-context lag positions (1, 2, and 3) were crossed within-
subjects yielding 6 types of target present trials.  It should be noted that on trials 
without a target present, observers’ false alarm and correct rejection responses 
cannot be associated with any particular lag condition.  In other words, there 
were only two types of target absent trials, those with associated contextual 
distractors and those without.  The overall false alarms following associated or 
unassociated contextual images will be used along with a particular hit rate to 
estimate sensitivity at each lag. 
 Results 
 Data from one subject was excluded for exceeding low performance (HR = 
.75, FA = .30, d’ = 1.21).  Overall performance was high with a HR = .87 (SD =  
.06) and a FA = .10 (SD = .07).  Subjects‘ sensitivity average d‘ = 2.78 (SD = 
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.58).  Figure 9 shows hit rates across the lag and contextual distractor 
relatedness conditions.   
  
Figure 9.  Hit rates for subjects in Experiment 1.  Error bars represent the 
standard error of the context effect at a given lag. 
 For each subject, sensitivity was calculated at each lag by context 
crossing.  Sensitivity for each of the 6 condition cells was quantified in terms of d’ 
using the hit rate at a given crossing and either the overall associated or overall 
unassociated false alarm rate.  As mentioned previously, trials without targets 
cannot be associated with any particular context to target lag.  Figure 10 shows 
the data.   
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Figure 10.  Sensitivity for object targets following associated or unassociated 
contexts at each lag.  Error bars represent the standard error of the contextual 
effect at a given lag. 
 Because of the clear relationship between the motivating theory and 
experimental design, planned repeated measures t-tests were conducted at each 
lag position comparing sensitivity following an associated or unassociated 
contextual image without an omnibus ANOVA.   Higher values of d’ indicate 
greater sensitivity.  At lag 1, observer sensitivity did not differ reliably, t(32) = .16, 
p > .05.  However, at lag 3 participants performed significantly more poorly on 
trials containing related contextual distractors (M = 2.47, SD = .18) compared 
with trials containing unrelated contextual distractors (M = 3.22, SD =.20), t(32) = 
2.90, p < .01.  Similarly, at lag 5, observers were more sensitive to object 
photograph targets following unassociated (M = 2.95, SD = .14) compared with 
associated (M = 2.56, SD = .14) contexts, t(32) = 2.59, p = .01.  
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 Bias was calculated for each subject using either the associated or the 
unassociated false alarm rate and the hit rate at a given context by lag crossing.  
Higher values of the criterion estimate C  indicate a more conservative standard 
of evidence for observers.  At lag 1, a repeated measures t-test indicates that 
subjects were significantly more conservative following an unassociated (M = .25, 
SD = .29) compared with an associated (M = -.07, SD = .55) context, t(32) = 
3.52, p < .01.  Differences in bias obtained at no other lag, p’s > .05. 
 Discussion 
 Overall performance was high; observers were able to quickly detect 
common objects in the RSVP stream successfully.  This indicates that observers 
understood the task and found it manageable.  However, the influence of 
associated contexts was evident in both sensitivity and bias effects.  The costs of 
the associated context at lags 3 and 5 are likely the best demonstration to date of 
true top-down attentional capture for the following reasons.  First, this 
demonstration of attentional capture occurs against a backdrop of an unspeeded 
detection task.  Typical experiments in attentional capture use response time as 
a dependent measure.  This is problematic for reasons discussed previously.   
Secondly, in studies dealing with attentional capture, what is often treated as a 
top-down effect can be easily explained in terms of inter-trial priming (Maljkovic & 
Nakayama, 1994; Belopolsky, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2010).  For example, if a 
subject is instructed to attend to selectively attend to a color and then actually 
views this color as the focus of attention across some number of trials, how can 
the effect of intending to attend to red be distinguished from the effect of viewing 
 114!
red?  This experiment can distinguish between these two possibilities.  On each 
trial, observers were required to establish an attentional set different from the 
previous trial.  This likely requires encoding of a verbal label and the generation 
of anticipatory representations that can be compared with upcoming stimuli.  
However, this is insufficient to truly establish top-down control of visual attention.  
If categories or images repeat frequently, manipulations involving trial to trial 
changes can only measure differences in the magnitude of intertrial priming and 
not capture in the absence of intertrial priming.  In this experiment, observers 
were presented with a target present trial only twice in the entire experiment.  
Each of these viewings involved a unique token image from the category.  
Through this control, the priming influence of one trial with a target category on a 
later trial with same category is minimized to the extent it is possible while 
maintaining a fair comparison between conditions.  In typical RSVP studies 
dealing with attentional capture, targets are defined in terms of properties along a 
single dimension across all trials (Barnard et al., 2004), across blocks (Leber, 
2004), across alternating runs (Lien, Ruthruff & Johnson, 2010), or in random 
sequences (Belopolsky, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2010).  To the best of my 
knowledge, no study of attentional capture has employed such a broad range of 
categorically defined targets in an unspeeded perceptual discrimination. 
 This experiment replicates recent findings showing that associations 
between objects and contexts results in predictable differences in attentional 
prioritization (Bar, 2004; Castelhano & Heaven, 2010).  More importantly, these 
data indicate that while observers can establish ACS relevant for a target on a 
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particular trial, the manner in which an observer’s ACS are utilized is partly out of 
observers’ control.  In this experiment, there was no advantage for attending to 
the contextual images in the RSVP sequence on any trial.  Contextual images 
never contained the target item and did not reliably signal the presence of the 
target item.  The difference in size between the contextual and target images was 
salient and could have been used as a cue to exclude processing of the 
contextual image.  Despite this, scene context images influenced observer 
performance, such that associated contexts captured attention.  Lastly, the costs 
of attentional capture on sensitivity take at least 80 ms to accumulate, replicating 
Auckland, Cave & Donnelly’s (2007) finding that associated objects sharing a 
common onset with a target do not affect object recognition performance (but see 
Joubert et al., 2008). In a related finding, object-based spatial attention capture 
effects are greatest when the object precedes the appearance of the cue and the 
target (Shomstein & Behrman, 2008).  Reliable differences in sensitivity obtained 
only at lags 3 and 5.   
 It is difficult to see how the effect of the contextual distractor could be 
attributed to any low-level sensory difference between the associated and 
unassociated contextual scenes.  In fact, the design ensured that the same 
images that appeared before related targets for one subject appeared before 
unrelated targets for others.  In terms of the overall perceptual difference 
between the contextual image and succeeding targets, one can see a masking 
effect for targets following either associated or unassociated contexts at lag-1.  A 
large low-level perceptual contrast in an RSVP sequence has been 
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demonstrated to disrupt attentional performance.  For example, recent evidence 
from Asplund et al. (2010) indicates that observers will miss targets in RSVP 
sequences due to an orienting response towards novel distractors.  When 
observers were presented with an unexpected stimulus, a deficit similar to the AB 
obtained for targets following soon after this unexpected distractor.  While the 
contextual scenes were novel on each trial and dissimilar from other object 
images in both scale and complexity, it is unlikely that the capture effect 
observed here is due to the surprise induced blindness described by Asplund 
and colleagues.  The surprise effect described in their study persisted only 
through the first few times that observers encountered an unexpected stimulus.  
By the time the observers reached their third surprise trial, the capture costs 
reversed.  In this experiment, a single novel contextual scene was shown on 
every trial, making it unlikely that an orienting response would persist over the 
course of the experiment.  More importantly, differences here are between 
related and unrelated contexts of equivalent novelty because each image was 
only viewed once.  Any differences in performance must be due solely to the 
relatedness of the contextual image. 
 This experiment is wholly consistent with the hypothesis that when 
observers are searching for an object they maintain anticipatory representations 
of schematic contexts associated with the target object.  This entirely top-down 
attentional capture effect left a 300 - 500 ms interval within which subjects were 
less sensitive to images of the target object.  However, interpretation of this effect 
is complicated by the use of detection as a dependent measure.  Strategic 
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guessing biased by scene information is easily mistakable for facilitation of 
schema consistent items (Hollingworth & Henderson, 1998; Auckland, Cave, & 
Donnelly, 2007).   Analytic techniques such as signal detection theory can correct 
for bias mathematically, but careful experimental design can yield observations 
where the influence of observer bias is minimized (Pelli & Farell, 1995).  This is 
particularly important given the debated role of bias in understanding the 
influence of context on object recognition (Biederman, 1981; Hollingworth & 
Henderson, 1998). 
 As mentioned in the discussion of Moores and colleagues work (2003), 
detection measures give little information about what types of information 
observers are using to complete the task.  In order to more precisely characterize 
this attentional capture effect, observers will need to perform a discrimination 
between two simultaneously presented targets.  The following chapter describes 
a series of experiments using discrimination accuracy as a performance 
measure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 118!
 
 
Chapter 5: Contextual Capture and Discrimination 
 In the following experiments, rather than having observers report whether 
or not a target item was presented in the sequence, observers indicated which of 
two category tokens was present in a two alternative forced choice (2AFC) task.  
Because both of these items fit the verbal description of the target item provided 
at the start of trial equally well, bias effects that might arise from guessing on the 
basis of the associated or unassociated contextual image were minimized.  Any 
differences in performance are unlikely to be due to observers’ response 
strategies because observers issued a single, unspeeded response 
discriminating between two alternatives that were equivalent along independent 
variable levels (Grider & Malmberg, 2008; Zeelenberg, Wagenmakers, Rotteveel, 
2006).  On average, observers should have no prior reason to choose one target 
token over another in the presented comparisons.  For example, if observers are 
instructed to find a chair in a sequence of images and two chairs are presented 
at the end of the trial, one present in the sequence and one a lure, there is no 
reason why either the verbal label displayed at the beginning of the trial or the 
contextual scene should bias observers towards one chair or another. 
 While presenting two alternatives does eliminate criterion setting bias, 
there are additional subtle differences between detection and discrimination 
tasks.  These differences make the contextual distractors less likely to have an 
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effect, so any positive evidence of contextual costs in these experiments can be 
interpreted as strong evidence in support of the motivating hypothesis.  First, 
rather than simply compare each presented image with anticipatory 
representations and retrospectively respond at the end of a trial when a match is 
detected, observers must now evaluate each item for relevance, make an online 
decision about category status, and selectively encode the visual details of 
matching items.  Previous research on attentional and perceptual load suggests 
that distractors are less likely to be processed when target processing is complex 
(Lavie, 1995).  To the extent that a within category discrimination is more 
perceptually complex than a simple detection task, it is less likely that contextual 
distractors will be engage perceptual processes.  Apart from these general task 
concerns, the distinguishing details for within category discriminations are 
concentrated at high spatial frequencies.  ACS in rapid picture perception include 
selection on the basis of spatial frequency information (Schyns & Oliva, 1997).  
Schematic scene categorization is closely associated with information 
concentrated at low spatial frequencies (Oliva & Torralba, 2001).  If subjects are 
selectively attending to information concentrated at high spatial frequencies, this 
may reduce the influence of the schematic contextual scene.  Lastly, 
discrimination is often an easier task than detection because the observer is 
presented with the target a second time.  Given these three considerations that 
might mitigate capture effects, if the influence of associated contexts is observed 
in Experiment 2, this would be stronger evidence that the processing of 
associated contexts is forced by diffuse ACS. 
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Experiment 2 
 Method  
 Participants.  43 (29 female) undergraduate students voluntarily 
participated in this experiment for extra-credit in undergraduate psychology 
classes. 
 Stimuli.  The stimuli from Experiment 1 were used.  Viewing conditions 
were identical to Experiment 1. 
 Procedure.  Each subject completed 138 test trials viewing each of the 69 
object context pairs twice.  The experiment was self paced.  As shown in Figure 
11, each trial began with the press of the space bar after which observers were 
presented with a one or two word verbal label indicating an object category they 
were to selectively encode from the image sequence for 500 ms.  Immediately 
following the presentation of the target object category label, observers were 
presented with a 12 image sequence at 100 ms/item. 
 After the sequence of images was presented, observers viewed a blank 
screen for 1000 ms, followed by two tokens from the target category.  Observers 
then indicated which of the simultaneously presented tokens was present in the 
RSVP sequence. Since both objects were drawn from the same verbally labeled 
target category, observers had no prior reason to select either of the choices.  
Responses were captured using spatially mapped buttons, such that if observers 
believed the left item was presented in the sequence they pressed “1” and if they 
believed the right item was presented they pressed “2”.  Targets and lures were 
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presented randomly as either the choice on the left or the choice on the right.  
The entire experiment took an average of 15 minutes. 
  
Figure 11.  Shows the trial sequence in Experiment 2.  Observers indicated 
which of two tokens was presented in a trial. 
  Design.  Contextual distractor relationship (associated, unassociated) and 
lag (lag 1, lag 2, lag 3) were manipulated.  These sequences contained one 
instance of the target object category which was inserted randomly into serial 
positions 5-8.  This target object was preceded by a context image at either 1, 2, 
or 3 serial positions prior (serial positions 2-7).  As in Experiment 1, this 
distracting contextual image was either associated or unassociated with the 
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target object.  It is anticipated that observers will be less accurate when the 
verbally cued target follows soon after an associated context.  
 On each exposure to any object context pair, participants were presented 
with a novel target object or context token that was chosen randomly without 
replacement.  No picture used as either a target or a lure in a 2AFC 
discrimination more than once.  However, as with the previous experiment, the 
same collection of images was used as both targets and distractors to control for 
image novelty and statistics. 
 Results 
 Observers correctly identified the presented target category token on 
79.1% (SD = 5.4%) of trials.  As can be seen in Figure 12, performance varied 
across both lag and contextual image relatedness conditions.  Three planned 
comparisons were conducted with t-tests for each lag condition comparing 
performance with related or unrelated contextual images.  At lag 1, no reliable 
differences obtained when comparing target recognition accuracy following 
related (M = 78.9%, SD = 9.5%) and unrelated (M = 79.7%, SD = 10.1%) 
contextual images, t(42) = .38, p > .05.  A second planned t-test compared 
related (M = 76.9%, SD = 10.5%) and unrelated (M = 81.3%, SD = 9.2%) 
performance at lag 2, revealing a reliable cost for items following closely after an 
associated context, t(42) = 2.20, p = .03.  Similarly, a planned t-test at lag 3 
revealed costs for associated contexts (M  = 77.3%, SD = 7.9%) over 
unassociated ones (M = 80.6%, SD = 8.3%), t(42) = 2.18, p = .03. 
 123!
  
Figure 12.  2AFC accuracy as a function of the preceding contextual image and 
the lag condition.  Error bars represent the standard error of the contextual effect 
at a given lag. 
 Discussion 
 As in Experiment 1, observers were able to rapidly establish anticipatory 
representations that permitted the selective treatment of target items in a stream 
of rapidly presented images.  In fact, a cursory comparison of Figures 13  and 11 
reveals a very similar effect.  In both cases, between costs from preceding 
contexts do not obtain unless targets fall at serial positions greater than lag 1.  
Unlike Experiment 1, here observers were instructed to make subtle within-
category discriminations comparing two similar tokens.  Observers correctly 
indicated the presented token on nearly four fifths of all trials.   This reflects 
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considerable flexibility in visual ACS representations.  These anticipatory 
representations can not only be used to detect target items in a rapid sequence, 
but can also be used to trigger the selective encoding of distinguishing token 
features.  Further, given that subtle differences in pose, color, texture, and form 
distinguished between the target and lure on each trial, these data are evidence 
that relatively detailed object representations are constructed by observers.  
Moreover, the costs indicate that the encoding of this detailed object knowledge 
is disrupted these associated contexts. 
 Despite this overall high discrimination performance, observers showed 
costs when targets were preceded by associated contexts compared with 
unrelated contexts.  Moreover, as with detection, this effect only emerged at lag 
positions greater than 1.  This replicated pattern of effects shows that associated 
contexts engage perceptual processing when observers search for common 
objects in a way that unassociated contexts do not and that this capture takes 
time to harm recognition performance.  Not only does this finding extend the 
generality of the effect from Experiment 1, it also demonstrates the effect in a 
task domain where observers were performing a discrimination relying on high 
spatial frequency information.  As mentioned previously, observers can tune ACS 
to selectively encode spatial frequency ranges appropriate for a task (Schyns & 
Oliva, 1997).  Information that is diagnostic for scene category is generally 
thought to be concentrated at low spatial frequencies (Bar, 2004).  The fact that 
relatively low spatial frequency information influenced the selective encoding of 
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high spatial frequency information is suggestive of obligatory processing of 
related scenes. 
 To describe the effect of related contexts more specifically, observers 
were less likely to accurately identify a target object when that target object 
followed associated contexts at lags greater than 1.  As mentioned previously, 
lag 1 sparing is a diagnostic feature in attentional blink phenomena.  The 
importance of lag 1 sparing, the phenomena’s underlying mechanisms and 
boundary conditions are currently debated (Dux & Marois, 2009).  The meaning 
of lag 1 sparing in these particular experiments is uncertain because the meaning 
of the effect is only coarsely characterized in general. 
 However, the interpretation of Experiments 1 and 2 is complicated by the 
fact that a scene, either related or unrelated to the target, was presented on each 
trial.  This was a key manipulation in demonstrating that associated contexts 
capture attention.  If only a portion of trials contain contextual distractors, these 
distractors will have increased salience due to their greater novelty.  This might 
result in a bottom-up capture effect.  In Experiments 1 and 2, we see costs of the 
distractors despite the fact that they are present on every trial.  At the same time, 
this means that the effect of the contextual manipulation cannot be attributed to 
either the enhancement of target processing following unrelated contexts or the 
impairment of target processing following related contexts.  Previous research 
has shown selection of items that are inconsistent with a simultaneously 
presented scene context (Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000; Gordon, 2006).   The 
difference in the effect of the contextual distractor as we move from lag 1 to lag 3 
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could be the enhanced processing of targets following a mismatched context.  
Alternatively, this difference could be the release of a target from forward 
masking following an perceptually dissimilar unassociated context image.  That 
is, both the target following an associated context and the target following an 
unassociated context are subject to forward masking at lag 1.  At lags greater 
than 1, the meaning of the stimulus is processed in the case of the target 
following an associated context, leading to reduced performance.  There is no 
such sustained engagement in the other case.  To test the attentional capture 
hypothesis, in Experiment 3 there are trials in which a contextual distractor is not 
present.  This permits the comparison of performance for targets following no 
contextual distractors, related contextual distractors, and unrelated contextual 
distractors.  If an unrelated context affords an encoding advantage for a target on 
a trial containing a contextual distractor compared with a trial without any 
contextual distractor, then the effect observed in Experiments 1 and 2 is due to 
the mismatch between the contextual distractor and the succeeding target.  On 
the other hand, if the attentional capture hypothesis is correct, we would only 
expect to see a difference between the related context trials and the no context 
trials.   
 There are other issues in the first two experiments that need to be 
addressed.  In order to describe an effect as attentional capture, it is necessary 
to describe performance of the task both before and after costs are observed.  
While additional chronometric exploration is desirable to fully characterize 
capture effects, at a minimum one must show performance before capture, 
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during capture, and following capture.  By measuring performance after a return 
to baseline, one ensures that the effect is temporally circumscribed and not the 
result of durable changes in some other cognitive mechanism (e.g. decision-
making).  In Experiment 3, lag 5 trials are replaced with lag 6 trials in an effort to 
demonstrate recovery following capture.  Lastly, while we have asserted that an 
unspeeded discrimination should not result in speed accuracy trade-offs, we 
have not measured response time.  In Experiment 3, we will measure response 
time directly to determine whether observers might respond more quickly in a 
given a condition, resulting in poorer performance than would otherwise be the 
case. 
 Lastly, in Experiments 1 and 2 great pains were taken to prevent the 
repetition of target images.  This decision, along with the variable mapping 
design, was made to minimize the possible influence of intertrial priming or the 
selective encoding of diagnostic features.  However, to show capture even when 
specific target images repeat extends the generality of the effect to cases where 
these possible influences are present.  In Experiment 3, target images were 
randomly sampled with replacement. 
Experiment 3 
 Method 
 Participants.  25 (23 Female) undergraduate observers with normal or 
corrected vision participated in the experiment. Observers were given extra-credit 
for participation. 
 128!
 Stimuli.  The same stimuli from Experiment 1 and 2 were used a third 
time.  Viewing conditions were identical to Experiments 1 and 2. 
 Procedure and design.  Observers completed 414 test trials identifying 
tokens from each of 69 object categories in a within-subjects factorial design.  
Each target category appeared 6 times during test trials, with two trials following 
no context, two trials following an unassociated context, and two trials following 
an associated context.   Both target images and lures were chosen randomly with 
replacement.  Before participants began these test trials, they completed 24 
practice trials with no contextual distractors using the same set of images as 
subsequent test trials.  Including both test and practice trials, each image was 
used approximately 18 times as a distractor in an RSVP sequence. 
 The timing of a given trial in this self-paced experiment was identical to 
Experiment 2.  As mentioned, the context-target interval now contained lags 1, 3, 
and 6.  Also, on a third of trials, the target object was presented without a 
distracting contextual image.   This establishes a baseline performance for 
comparison to the experimental conditions.  As before, the relationship between 
the preceding contextual image, on the two thirds of trials that contained 
contextual distractors, and target image was manipulated so that it could either 
be associated or unassociated. Observers completed the same bias-controlling 
2AFC at the end of each trial as in Experiment 2.  The entire experiment took an 
average of 45 minutes for participants to complete. 
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 Results 
 Figure 14 shows overall object recognition performance on trials 
containing contextual distractors in Experiment 3.   Because lag conditions are 
not meaningful when contextual distractors are absent from a trial, the effect of 
context will be measured while collapsing across lag conditions.  A one-way 
within-subjects ANOVA with context condition (none, unassociated, associated) 
as the independent variable revealed a reliable effect of context, F(2,48) = 3.414, 
p = .04.  A planned within-subjects t-test comparing control (M = 84.7%, SD = 
6.9%) and unrelated (M = 83.1%, SD = .05%) conditions revealed no reliable 
effect of unrelated contexts, t(24) =1.46, p = .16.  On the other hand, a planned 
within-subjects t-test comparing control and related (M = 82.1%, SD = 5.4%) 
conditions, showed an advantage for targets on trials without contextual 
distractors, t(24) = 2.39, p = .03.  These data indicate that the effects observed in 
Experiments 1 and 2 are costs of related contexts, rather than an advantage for 
items following unrelated contexts. 
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Figure 13.  The effects of contextual distractors and lag in Experiment 3.  
Accuracy on contextual distractor free, and hence not lag conditioned, trials is 
visualized with the plot on the right edge.  Error bars indicate the standard error 
of the contextual effect at a given lag.   
 Planned within-subjects t-tests were conducted at each lag condition.  As 
was the case in Experiments 1 and 2, there was no difference in performance at 
lag 1, t(24) = .61, p = .54.  In a replication of Experiment 2, at lag 2 there was a 
cost for targets following related contexts (M = 80.7%, SD = 6.9%) compared 
with unrelated contexts (M = 84.0%, SD = 6.3%), t(24) = 2.82, p = .01.  Last, and 
importantly, there was no reliable difference between discrimination accuracy for 
targets following associated and unassociated contexts at lag 6, t(24) = .40, p = 
.70.  This recovery for targets occurring late in the sequence demonstrates that 
the cost following the related context is transient.  This is consistent with an 
attentional capture account. 
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 As mentioned previously, response time measures were captured to 
ensure that observers were not engaging in a speed-accuracy trade off.  A one-
way, within-subjects ANOVA treating context (none, unassociated, associated) 
revealed no reliable effect of context on response time, F(2,48) = .07, p = .94.  
That is, response times following no context (M = 1074 ms, SD = 25 ms), an 
unrelated context (M = 1069 ms, SD = 29 ms), and a related context (M = 1078, 
SD = 31 ms) were not statistically distinguishable. 
 Discussion  
 These data replicate the general pattern of performance observed in 
Experiments 1 and 2.  Namely, costs for targets following distractors did not 
obtain at lag 1 while these effects were present at lags greater than 1.  However, 
unlike Experiments 1 and 2, target images were repeated in the current 
experiment.  These capture effects do not depend on unfamiliarity with a 
particular image.  We can see this capture effect persists under a broad range of 
perceptual tasks including detection of named targets, discrimination of relatively 
unfamiliar targets, and the discrimination of familiar targets. 
 Experiment 3 did not simply replicate and extend Experiments 1 and 2, but 
addressed possible deficiencies in their designs.  First, it is now reasonable to 
assert that the effects in Experiments 1 and 2 are costs for targets following 
related contexts.  In the present experiment, there was no reliable difference 
between overall performance on trials with unassociated contexts and trials 
without contextual images.  In contrast, there were reliable differences between 
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trials without contextual images and trials with related contexts.  This is 
consistent with an account where related contexts capture visual attention and 
deprive targets in a circumscribed period following the context of encoding 
resources.  Second, Experiment 3 showed recovery following the contextual 
distractor at lag 6.  The sparing of targets at lag 6 indicates that the related 
contexts have a transient effect and do not disrupt cognitive mechanism 
associated with decisions or responses.  Third, response time measures from 
Experiment 3 indicate that observers take approximately the same amount of 
time to respond on trials without contextual images, those with related contextual 
images, and those with unrelated contextual images.  In fact, while the difference 
was not statistically significant, subjects were the slowest following related 
contexts.  Since this is the condition in which performance was worst, subjects 
likely did not trade accuracy for speed. 
 However, interpretation of the data from Experiments 1, 2, and 3 is 
complicated by the fact that multiple lags were employed.  When observers are 
presented with a temporal selection task with multiple possible target lags, it can 
be difficult to adopt a strategy for responding that covers all possible lags equally 
well (Caetta & Gorea, 2010).  For example, an observer might complete 3 trials 
with a long lag between context images and targets.  Over these three trials 
observers may calibrate their decision processes for a certain level of evidence 
or adopt a certain encoding strategy.  On the fourth trial observers might be 
asked to identify a second target after a short lag.  Poor performance on this 
fourth trial would then result from two causes.  One is the innate change in 
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difficulty when multiple task relevant items are presented closer in time.  This is 
of primary theoretical interest, will likely make the task easier or harder, and is 
the intended effect of the manipulation.  In addition to this essential cause, 
strategy carryover effects may also interfere with observer accuracy.  Because 
multiple lags were employed in Experiments 1, 2 and 3, poor performance might 
have been exacerbated by inappropriate criteria or strategy on particular trials.  
Another way of thinking about the effect in the first three experiments, involves 
focusing on the factorial combination of context and lag conditions.  If a 
participant is trying to learn how to report the target and exclude the contextual 
scene from processing, this will be harder when the temporal relationship 
between these items is varied.  In some strained sense, we are asking the 
participant to learn a unique task at each of the possible lags.  While it is unlikely, 
the failures of attentional control that results in costs on associated trials could 
result from control mechanisms being overwhelmed by the frequent “task-
switches” as we move from lag to lag.   A stronger test of the hypothesis that 
associated contexts capture attention during temporal search would involve the 
presentation of contextual images and target images in a fixed temporal pattern.  
In this way, participants will be able to settle into a consistent internal strategy for 
identifying targets.  In Experiment 4 observers were presented with targets 
following contexts at a fixed temporal interval 
 
 
 134!
Experiment 4 
 Method 
 Participants.  20 (13 Female) undergraduate observers with normal or 
corrected vision participated in the experiment. Observers were given extra-credit 
for participation. 
 Stimuli, design, and procedure.  The stimuli from Experiment 1, 2, and 3 
were used a third time.  Viewing conditions were identical to the previous 
experiments. These 69 stimuli were supplemented with two more, for a total of 71 
object categories .  Observers completed 142 trials identifying tokens from each 
of 71 object categories twice.  No image served as a target or lure more than 
once. 
 This self-paced experiment was identical to Experiment 2, except that only 
lag 2 was utilized.  As before, the relationship between the preceding contextual 
image and target image was manipulated so that it could either be associated or 
unassociated. Observers completed the 2AFC discrimination at the end of each 
trial as in Experiment 2.  The entire experiment took an average of 15 minutes. 
 Results 
 Figure 14 shows object recognition performance in Experiment 4.  As 
anticipated, observers were more accurate in identifying targets that appeared 
following unrelated contexts (M = 77.6%, SD = 5.5%) compared with related 
contexts (M = 74.1%, SD = 7.2%), t(19) = 2.43, p = .03.  To ensure that 
 135!
observers’ strategy did not change over the course of the experiment, a 
comparison of attentional capture effects (unrelated context accuracy - related 
context accuracy) in the first (M = 3.6%, SD = 10.7%) and second halves (M = 
4.0%, SD = 12.0%) of the experiment was conducted and revealed no reliable 
differences, t(19) = .09, p > .05. 
  
Figure 14.  2AFC accuracy for object photographs following associated and 
unassociated contexts at lag 2 exclusively.  Error bars represent the standard 
error of the contextual effect. 
 Discussion 
 Experiment 4 demonstrates that even in situations where observers can 
set a uniform encoding strategy with a highly practiced perceptual task, costs still 
obtain for target items following associated contexts.  This attentional capture 
effect is so robust that even when a single lag is used across the entire 
experiment observers show no ability to overcome this cost.  Additionally, the 
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capture effect was uniform between experimental halves.  This argues against 
explanations based around participant misunderstanding or speech pragmatics.  
If observers mistakenly believe they are to find the target object located in a 
contextual scene, they should be disabused of this notion by the time they 
complete the 71st trial.  Despite what is likely to be a clear understanding of the 
task, observers can’t help but attend to the contextual images.  
Experiment 5 
 There are at least two explanations that might account for the contextual 
costs demonstrated in the previous four experiments.  On the one hand, I have 
been advocating an explanation based on attentional capture.  From this 
perspective, observers’ performance suffers because they are identifying 
relevant information in the RSVP stream on the basis of diffuse ACS that 
includes representations of contexts where target items have been previously 
encountered.  When the presented images match this context, perceptual 
processing is engaged by the contextual image and performance suffers 
because, by the time the target is presented, insufficient resources are available 
for elaborated representation.  Alternatively, these effects might also be 
explained in terms of interference between related items in near term memory 
processes.  That is, we could be observing something analogous to a failure in 
directed forgetting.  In an account focused on interference effects, related 
contexts may simply compete with targets more effectively than unrelated 
contexts.  Observers’ poor performance in the related condition doesn’t 
necessarily result from capture directly, but all distractors are processed to the 
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degree they match anticipatory representations.  On trials with related contexts 
this processing continues further than on trials with unrelated contexts.  While 
both of these possibilities involve breakdowns in attentional control on the basis 
of object-context associations, there are important differences.  If interference 
between related items in visual short-term memory (VSTM) or conceptual short-
term memory (CSTM) explains the effect we would anticipate similar costs for 
targets that are followed by associated contexts in much the same way we see 
costs for targets that precede contexts.  However, if attentional capture has a role 
in this related context cost, it would be important that the context precede the 
target in the RSVP sequence.  
 Method 
 Participants.  34 (26 Female) undergraduate observers with normal or 
corrected vision participated in the experiment. Observers were given extra-credit 
for participation. 
 Stimuli, design, and procedure.  The experimental design was exactly 
the same as Experiment 4, with associated and unassociated object-context 
pairs presented in rapid succession in RSVP sequences.  The only difference 
between Experiment 4 and Experiment 5 involves the order in which the 
associated items were presented.  In Experiment 4, the context preceded the 
object, in Experiment 5 the object will precede the context.  Because of this 
manipulation, objects appeared on average two serial positions earlier in 
Experiment 5 than in Experiment 4.  Previous research has identified a cost for 
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items occurring early in an RSVP sequence, referred to as an attentional 
awakening effect (Ariga & Yokosawa, 2008).  However, the difference in target 
serial position between Experiments 4 and 5 is small.  Further, to the extent that 
this experiment is designed to provide a strong evaluation of the attentional 
capture account, if subjects perform poorly in Experiment 5 due to serial position 
differences that is not a difficulty because we would predict better performance.  
More importantly, our comparison addresses the associative relationship 
between the target and context, so differences in overall performance are not 
important provided they do not push participants to a performance floor or ceiling. 
 Results 
 Discrimination performance in shown in Figure 15.  As anticipated a 
within-subjects t-test did not reveal any differences in discrimination accuracy for 
targets following unassociated (M = 79.1%, SD = 4.7%) or associated (M = 
80.4%, SD = 6.9%) contexts, t(33) = 1.21, p = .23.  While null results must 
always be interpreted with caution, a post-hoc power analysis assuming the 
effect size of Experiment 4 indicates that observed power was approximately .93.  
This is a reasonable level of power.  An independent samples t-test comparing 
overall accuracy in Experiment 4 (M = 75.8%, SD = 5.4%) and Experiment 5 (M = 
79.8%, SD = 4.9%), t(53) = 2.70, p = .01. 
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Figure 15.  2AFC accuracy for object photographs followed by associated and 
unassociated contexts at lag 2.  Error bars represent the standard error of the 
contextual effect. 
 Discussion 
 Experiment 5 provided no evidence of costs for targets that are followed 
by related contexts.  Moreover, overall performance was higher in Experiment 5 
than Experiment 4.  These two findings are consistent with an account based on 
attentional capture and not interference in memory during the retention interval 
between the presentation of the target and the discrimination response at the end 
of a trial. 
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Chapter 6: General Discussion 
 These experiments were motivated by the hypothesis that depictions of 
schematized associated contexts capture visual attention during object search.  
Specifically, it was hypothesized that this attentional capture effect is non-spatial, 
transient, and will result in costs for targets following soon after a related context.  
While attending to contexts associated with a target is typically adaptive, in these 
experiments the presentation of the target of the target and context was 
manipulated to set the two in competition in a challenging object search task.  
Targets compete effectively with associates (Moores et al., 2003), so structuring 
a task where costs are observed presents challenges.  These experiments used 
a focal contingent capture paradigm (Ghorashi et al., 2003) where both 
distractors and targets appear in rapid succession at fixation. 
 The following discussion will review the implications of these experiments 
for our understanding of the control of visual attention and object-context 
relationships in object identification.  First, we will review the key findings of these 
experiments.  Second, we will review the consequences of these experiments for 
theories of the control of visual attention.  Third, we will address the role of 
contextual associations in object recognition, as illuminated by this line of 
research. 
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Key Findings 
 Experiment 1 demonstrated that in a detection task, observers’ sensitivity 
is harmed when the target is preceded by an associated context.  In Experiment 
2, we replicated this cost using a discrimination task.  Detection and 
discrimination are related, but distinct perceptual tasks (de la Rosa, Choudhery, 
Chatziastros, 2011).  Experiment 3 addressed possible methodological concerns 
from Experiments 1 and 2.  Specifically, we demonstrated that the effect of the 
contextual manipulation is a cost for items following soon after associated 
contexts (rather than a benefit for targets following unassociated contexts).  
Additionally, this experiment indicates that this cost is transient, as recovery was 
observed for targets appearing in the lag 6 condition.  Lastly, this experiment 
indicates that even when observers are repeatedly shown the same target 
images, performance for targets following associated contexts still suffers.  
Experiment 4 indicates that even when the targets and contexts are presented in 
a stable temporal relationship, costs from associated contexts still obtain.  
Finally, in Experiment 5, we show that these costs are likely due to encoding 
processes.  When observers are presented with the same items in the opposite 
order, that is, when the contextual distractor follows the target, there was no cost 
of an associated context. 
 These five experiments describe the role of abstract conceptual 
knowledge about  scenes associated with common objects in a temporal search 
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task.  The data clearly demonstrate that: a) knowledge about contextual 
associations is active during an object search task where this knowledge is 
irrelevant; b) observers are able to select particular objects as the focus of 
selective mechanisms, but have limited control over the way in which they search 
for these objects; c) the effect of presenting a scene that matches this contextual 
knowledge depends critically on the timing between the presentation of the scene 
and the target; d) these costs obtain in both detection and discrimination tasks; 
and e) these capture effects are non-spatial.  Methodological controls ensures 
that each of these conclusions does not depend on strategic guessing or post-
perceptual cognitive processes. 
Implications for Attentional Control Processes 
 These experiments are among the best demonstrations to date of top-
down attentional capture for several reasons.  First, participants completed an 
unspeeded object search task.  While demonstrations that show capture using 
response time measures are useful (e.g. Moores et al., 2003), one cannot be 
certain that only perceptual processes are being strained.  It is preferable, when 
evaluating theories of attentional control, that measures of attentional 
performance load onto data-limited and not resource-limited processes (Norman 
& Bobrow, 1975).  Second, in these experiments the target changed on each trial 
and repeated infrequently.  Recent reports have disputed the role of top-down 
attentional control in contingent capture paradigms (Belopolsky et al., 2010).  In 
most previous demonstrations using a similar design, the target defining criteria 
has been blocked across trials.  This design choice results in capture effects that 
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might result from either top-down attentional control or bottom-up priming of task 
relevant features (Folk & Remington, 2008).  In these experiments, because the 
target category changed on each trial (Experiments 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) and 
repeated only once using novel pictures (Experiments 2 and 4), intertrial priming 
is an unlikely explanation for the capture effects observed.  The possibility of 
intertrial priming was further reduced by the use of a variable mapping design 
and novel contextual distractors (Experiments 1,2, and 4).  Third, attentional 
capture was demonstrated in paradigms with distinct perceptual tasks.  Costs for 
targets following associated contexts obtained in both detection and 
discrimination tasks showing the generality of the effect.  Fourth, performance for 
targets suffered in experiments where contextual distractors (both related an 
unrelated) were present on all trials (Experiment 2) and when the contextual 
distractors appeared on only two thirds of trials (Experiment 3).  This suggests 
that attentional capture does not depend on the novelty of the contextual 
distractor in the object RSVP sequence.  
 These data support accounts where attentional capture can occur on the 
basis of high-level task representations.  Recent demonstrations of attentional 
capture in visual search, suggests that relational properties (e.g. redder), rather 
than individuated dimension levels (e.g. red) support selective processing 
(Becker, 2010).  Observers were able to effectively establish search templates 
that identified categorically defined targets rapidly.  However, the specificity of 
these search templates is low, such that scenes associated with the target 
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engage processing. Despite extensive practice, observers seem unable to tune 
their ACS more narrowly and exclude these related distractors.   
 As mentioned previously, this stands in contrast to recent demonstrations 
of surprise induced blindness by Asplund and colleagues (2010).  In these 
experiments a novel and visually salient distractor produced deficits in target 
processing over the course of several hundred milliseconds following its 
presentation.  However, with repeated exposure to these unexpected distractors, 
participants were able to tune their attentional control mechanisms to exclude 
this salient, but irrelevant, information.  In Experiments 1, 2, and 4, observers 
were presented with related scene distractors on each of over one hundred trials 
and these costs persisted.   
 There are many studies that have shown that participants will attend to 
emotional stimuli (Codispoti, Bradley, & Lang, 2001).  In some ways, the 
demonstrations in the current experiments are similar to the attentional capture 
findings described by Most, Chun, Widders, and Zald (2005).  In this series of 
experiments, observers were instructed to locate an oriented landscape in an 
RSVP sequence containing a variety of upright landscape photos.  At the end of 
the trial, they were to indicate whether the oriented landscape faced the left or 
the right.  Critically, this landscape photo was preceded by an emotionally 
engaging scene by either 2 or 8 serial positions.  When an engaging scene 
preceded the target by 2 serial positions, discrimination accuracy suffered.  
There were no costs when this scene preceded the target by 8 serial positions.  
This deficit is described by the authors as emotion-induced blindness.  The 
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researchers explore a number of variables that influence this effect, including the 
specificity of the attentional set for the target (any oriented image vs. a particular 
oriented image) and personality variables (harm avoidance).   These experiments 
demonstrate that when an item engages attention, performance for items 
following soon after suffers.  However, unlike the demonstration by Most and 
colleagues, in the experiments presented in this paper, observers do not 
demonstrate a deficit for an overall and consistent class of stimuli (e.g. emotional 
scenes).  Rather, it was the specific relationship between the target and 
preceding distractor on a particular trial that determined performance.  If one 
takes the perspective that emotion-induced blindness is caused by attentional 
allocation on the basis of visual cues to situations of biological relevance, it would 
be fair to characterize attention to emotional stimuli as a persistent and 
ubiquitous set of ACS parameters.  In contrast, the current experiments 
measures the costs associated with incorrectly allocating attention to scenes on 
the basis of transient ACS parameters.  Whereas Most and colleagues show 
evidence of emotion-induced blindness, these data might be characterized as 
task-induced blindness.  Task here is defined quite narrowly, as the search for a 
particular categorically defined target.  Participants only miss the targets when 
they are preceded by a distractor related to that target.  
 This deficit for targets following related distractors is not without 
precedent.  As mentioned previously, work by Barnard and colleagues (2004) 
showed that when observers are searching an RSVP sequence for profession 
words (e.g. baker), targets appearing soon after words that describe non-
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professional roles (e.g. father) suffer.  Observers apparently maintain a coarse 
attentional set and words that partially match the target category are selected for 
elaboration.  However, in this previous work observers detected or identified a 
single target category over the course of the entire experiments.  For reasons 
described earlier, it is easier to demonstrate attentional capture when a single 
target category is employed for multiple, successive trials.  In contrast, the 
experiments presented in this paper involved a changed target category on each 
trial.  The fact that attentional capture on the basis of related meaning has been 
demonstrated with both constant and changing target categories suggests that 
the coarseness of the attentional filter does not depend critically on target 
category variability.  
 A related demonstration is provided by Evans & Wolfe (2010).  In this 
series of experiments, participants were instructed to detect a cued scene 
category in a rapidly presented series of patterned masks.  The verbal label used 
to cue a category was provided either before or after the sequence of images.  A 
limited range of scene categories were employed.  When observers were 
presented with the cued target scene within 200 ms of a meaningful scene from 
one of the other categories, performance for the target suffered.  For example, if 
observers were instructed to detect a beach scene in the sequence, and this 
beach scene was preceded by a bridge scene among otherwise meaningless 
patterned images, subjects were less likely to detect the beach scene because of 
interference from this other meaningful scene category.  It appears as though 
observers are unable to shield their processing of the cued target from the 
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interference created by this other meaningful scene, in much the same way that 
target processing was disrupted in the experiments presented in this paper.  
However, unlike the work by Evans and Wolfe, the capture effects observed in 
these experiments depended on the cued target on a specific trial.  In fact, to the 
extent that unassociated contexts on a trial might have been associated with 
other targets, the capture effects described by Evans and Wolfe might mask the 
task-specific capture effects observed in the present experiments by increasing 
interference on trials with contexts unassociated with the target. 
 While these experiments were not designed to arbitrate among theories of 
the AB, they can address the filtering mechanisms that are increasingly central in 
recent accounts.  Initially, the AB was believed to be the result of inhibitory 
mechanisms shielding the current contents of VSTM from competing distractors 
(Raymond et al., 1992).   More recently, theoretical accounts of the AB focus on 
the role of attentional filters in the phenomenon.  As mentioned previously, the 
temporary loss of control account argues that the attentional blink results from 
the reconfiguration of the attentional filter following an encounter with an initial 
target (DiLollo et al., 2005).  The boost and bounce theory argues that the strong 
mismatch between a lag 1 distractor and the initial target results in an inhibitory 
signal that transiently disrupts processing at lags greater than 1 (Olivers, 2009).  
Regardless of the specific account of the AB, in most cases the evaluation of 
incoming stimuli is hypothesized to occur during a filtering stage where task 
relevant information is elaborated or consolidated.  These experiments suggest 
that this filter is tuned quite broadly, selecting both the current target and 
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associated, but visually dissimilar, information.  This is an important finding, 
because most studies of the attentional blink use relatively impoverished stimuli 
such as numbers, letters, or words. 
 Taken together, the experiments in this paper are consistent with 
conceptualizations of attentional control that emphasize high-level flexibility 
(Huettig, Olivers, & Hartsuiker, 2010; Olivers, 2010).  Control of attention is 
flexible in the sense that observers are able to establish ACS for the identification 
of a verbally specified target quickly and consistently.  Control of visual attention 
is argued to occur at a high level because the distractor-target relationship that  
resulted in costs was abstract and consisted of conceptual, associative linkages.  
Related contextual targets were visually dissimilar from targets.  If attentional 
capture effects occur consistently on the basis of object-context relationship, this 
suggests that whatever criteria were employed for the selection of task-relevant 
objects is at least partly non-visual.  Additionally, the observation of attentional 
capture with uniformly novel contextual distractors is inconsistent with any 
sensory or low-level account of the capture effects. 
 Attentional control, in the current experiments, seems to be operating on 
relatively elaborated representations of the presented objects and scenes.  In 
terms of possible memory structures, this is consistent with accounts of volatile, 
but semantically elaborated, representations in CSTM (e.g.  Potter, 1976).  From 
the perspective of selection levels in attentional mechanisms, these data are 
broadly consistent with late selection accounts, where attention prioritizes task 
relevant stimuli only after the meaning of the stimulus is extracted (Deutsch & 
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Deutsch, 1963).  Indeed, for reasons to be elaborated in the following section, 
there justification to conclude that the speed of object recognition is primarily of 
function of later stages of the ventral pathway (McKeeff, 2009).  However, it 
should be mentioned that the locus of selection in classic cognitive psychological 
theories appears to depend critically on the perceptual load of task (Lavie, 1995).  
Therefore, any discussion of the selection stage in perceptual processing must 
be in the context of a particular task.     
Implications for Theories of Object Recognition 
 These experiments not only have consequences for attentional control 
processes, but also for our understanding of object recognition more generally.  
In each  novel experiment presented in this paper, observers detected or 
selectively encoded a verbally cued common object.  There is an extensive 
research tradition that identifies the effects of visual context on object recognition 
sensitivity (e.g. Auckland et al., 2009) and bias (e.g. Hollingworth & Henderson, 
1999).  These present experiments extend this research tradition in several 
important ways.  First, observers were required to identify a cued target.  
Because human object recognition is generally successful, observers are not 
typically provided with a label prior to the recognition task.  The RSVP task in 
these experiments, with masking and brief presentations, was sensitive to 
contextual influences despite the fact that object category was known at the start 
of each trial.  Second, the current experiments presented the associated context 
in a way that actually harms object recognition.  This is important for two related 
reasons.  On the one hand, in typical object recognition paradigms, observers’ 
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responses regarding targets embedded in associated contexts are more 
accurate.  Here they are less accurate.  This shows that the effect of an 
associated context can be beneficial or detrimental depending on the temporal 
and spatial relationship between the context and target information sources.  In 
much the same way that inaccurate spatial search cues can interfere with spatial 
visual search (Manginelli & Pollman, 2009, Fiske & Sanocki, 2010), inaccurate 
temporal cues can interfere with recognition during temporal visual search.  In an 
additional consequence of this contextual cost, these experiments support the 
hypothesis that associated contexts automatically engage attentive processes.  
While this is important for our understanding of attentional control, this also has 
consequences for object recognition.  Specifically, it suggests that searching for 
an object automatically activates representations of associated contexts.  When 
items match these associated representations, they compete more successfully 
with targets that control stimuli. 
 These experiments replicate previous work indicating that certain 
contextual effects take time to accrue (e.g. Auckland et al., 2009).  In 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3, observers did not show any effect of the contextual 
distractor at lag 1.  Only after 80 - 100 ms, or one intervening distractor, did the 
contextual costs emerge.  There are a number of hypothesized perceptual 
structures that might account for this delay.  For example, certain interactivist 
accounts of visual cognition emphasize the role of re-entrant visual processes.  
These connections are argued to provide high-level hypotheses regarding earlier 
visual features.  When there is a mismatch between the re-entrant and primary 
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representation, this disrupts processing, as is observed in the characteristic 
object substitution masking effect (DiLollo, Enns& Rensink, 2000).  Bar provides 
another possible account that would predict the latency of this contextual effect 
(Bar, 2004).  In this model, observers generate perceptual hypotheses about a 
scene based on low spatial frequency information available rapidly via 
magnocellular visual pathways.  This coarse scene category information is then 
used by frontal areas to form hypotheses about the identity of individual objects 
as they are represented in the later stages of the ventral visual processing 
pathway.  While these two models differ both in terms of content and process, 
they share the prediction that some contextual effects will depend critically on the 
relative timing of an object and a distractor. 
 Indeed, recent evidence suggests that temporal limitations in object 
recognition occur primarily due to factors late in object processing (McKeeff, 
2009).  McKeeff argues that neurons responsible for high-level object decisions, 
such as category membership, require a longer temporal window over which to 
integrate and analyze perceptual evidence for a given categorization.  This 
longer temporal receptive field is analogous to the larger spatial receptive fields 
found anteriorly along visual processing pathways.  Generally speaking, neurons 
early along the ventral visual pathway show greater location specificity and 
respond selectively to low-level visual attributes, such as color or orientation.  In 
contrast, later neurons respond more robustly to high-level factors (e.g. face-
ness) and show less location specificity.  When multiple items appear in the 
same receptive field, information about about each item is diminished. 
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 Desimone & Duncan (1995) elaborate this insight and present a broad 
framework for the integration of attention and working memory.  Within the 
biased competition account of visual attention, objects compete for scarce 
cognitive resources.  Evidence for this competition includes the interference 
effects observed when observers are required to respond to multiple 
simultaneously presented objects (Duncan, 1984).  From a physiological 
perspective, the authors argue that, given a relatively fixed number and scope of 
receptive fields available in the ventral processing stream, the presence of 
additional objects in a given receptive field will decrease the available information 
regarding target objects.  The outcome of this competition can be biased by 
either bottom-up or top-down factors.  In the case of bottom-up factors, stimulus 
attributes including abrupt onsets or other transients will bias this system toward 
greater representation of those features associated with these salience-
producing manipulations.  Similarly, top-down factors such as the observer’s 
current attentional set will favor the processing of some objects over others.  
Objects and features consistent with this set will be selectively enhanced at the 
expense of unrelated information.  This biased competition account of visual 
attention has many advantages.  It can treat object-centered behavioral effects in 
visual attention in a reasonably intelligible manner.  By bringing visual attention 
and working memory into a shared theoretical framework, researchers can 
develop paradigms that treat broader scoped cognitive acts.  The present 
experiments enhance this account by suggesting that competition within temporal 
receptive fields occurs on the basis of abstract knowledge. 
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Conclusions 
 Object recognition represents a ubiquitous and mysterious aspect of 
human mental life.   Object recognition systems are implicated in virtually all 
aspects of complex human behavior, ranging from the mundane to the technical.  
Understanding and improving human performance in these tasks will require 
significant theoretical development.  The present experiments describe the role 
of contextual associations in the selective encoding of verbally cued familiar 
objects.  As such, they have implications for both our understanding of attentional 
control and models of object recognition.  In terms of attentional control, these 
experiments describe tasks in which observers have high level control, but fail to 
be able to exclude clearly irrelevant, but conceptually related, object information.  
These data suggest that object recognition can be harmed by the presentation of 
associated contexts and relies on contextual information even in cases when it 
should not. 
 As is the case in so many perceptual domains, the very mechanisms that 
permit successful performance of complex tasks can limit performance in other 
cases.  The associative knowledge about objects and scenes, that can support 
rapid and seemingly effortless object recognition in some settings can interfere 
with those very processes.  Future research addressing these lapses in encoding 
control will have clear implications for both basic and applied question in visual 
cognition. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A1: List of Object, Context Categories  
 
Object Category Associated 
Context 
airplane airport 
alarm bedside table 
ambulance hospital 
apple produce 
department 
armchair living room 
barbell gym 
baseball baseball diamond 
basketball basketball court 
beer bottle cooler 
bike bike rack 
camel desert 
car freeway 
cash register checkout 
church bell wedding interior 
circular saw workshop 
clothing iron ironing board 
computer computer desk 
cookie cookie jar 
cooking pan stovetop 
cow farm 
cowboy boots cowboy 
crane construction site 
dog doghouse 
doll dollhouse 
duck pond 
elephant zoo 
fence yard 
football football field 
goldfish aquarium 
grill patio 
hairdryer hair salon 
hammer toolbox 
handcuffs police 
hockey stick hockey rink 
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Appendix 1 (Continued) 
Table A1 (Continued) 
 
horse farm 
jack in the box toy box 
lunch tray cafeteria 
money bag vault 
necklace jewelry box 
oar rowboat 
paint palette art studio 
pancakes breakfast 
pepperoni pizza 
pillow bed 
robin nest 
saddle horse context 
sailboat lake 
scuba underwater 
seagull beach 
seashell beach 
shopping cart grocery store 
skis ski lodge 
soccer ball soccer game 
spider spider web 
stethoscope doctor’s office 
swan pond 
table knife dish rack 
tennis racquet tennis court 
tent camp site 
toaster kitchen 
toilet bathroom 
toothbrush toothpaste counter 
tractor farm 
train railroad tracks 
violin orchestra 
volleyball volleyball court 
watering can garden 
wedding ring wedding ceremony 
wrapped present christmas tree 
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Appendix 1 (Continued) 
Table A2 Object Images  
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Appendix 1 (Continued) 
Table A2 Object Images (Continued)  
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Appendix 1 (Continued) 
Table A3  Context Images  
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Appendix 1 (Continued) 
Table A3  Context Images (Continued) 
 
